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Abstract
Traditional view of natural language semantics conceives meanings of expressions
as being constant from speaker to speaker. This idealistic hypothesis has often
been considered as an explanation of how language users are able communicate.
The traditional paradigm to learning semantics (which we refer to as learning by
recognizing) shows how such a uniformity may be achieved, provided that there is
an externally imposed semantic standard which does not change during learning.
These paradigms have resulted in plethora of interesting approaches and practical
applications. It seems, however, that the uniform view of semantics does not always
correspond to facts. To illustrate this, we mention some evidence of within-language
synchronic semantic variation. This sort of variation consists in co-existence of non-
equivalent semantics within the same language community at a given time. On
these grounds we abandon both the uniform approach to semantics and learning
by recognizing which is tightly connected to the static view of meaning. Learning
by recognizing is also considered as inappropriate for the analysis of communica-
tion phenomena which defy description in terms of the traditional teacher-learner
distinction.
To explain how communication is possible within a semantically non-uniform
community of speakers connected by various social relations of authority, we con-
sider a more general mechanism of learning which we call learning by coordination.
We give our solution to the problem and define the coordination mechanism which
is capable of handling inconsistent samples of language use and various social in-
fluences between communicating speakers. We apply this algorithm to learning the
semantics of upward monotone proportional quantifiers. We consider simple models
of symmetrically communicating dyads and show how to analyse coordination of
such processes in terms of Markov chains. We observe various mathematical con-
nections between the possibility of convergence, specific levels of agents authority
and complexity of communication patterns.
Moreover, we study some natural language constructions which are deemed
to express the existence of certain kinds of similarities between partial orderings.
Specifically, we provide examples of natural language sentences and their plausible
logical forms that express the existence of homomorphism, embedding and varia-
tions of those. Semantically, we interpret the constructions as polyadic generalized
quantifiers. We examine some of the quantifiers in question with respect to their
FO-definability over appropriate finite models. Since they are definable in the exis-
tential fragment of SO, we investigate their completeness in the class NP . We prove
that among the quantifiers under investigation, only the homomorphism quantifier
is tractable. We stress potential importance of our results for linguistics and dis-
cuss some connections between computational complexity, human comprehension
and language evolution.

Streszczenie
Zgodnie z tradycyjnym podejściem do semantyki języka naturalnego, znaczenia wy-
rażeń są na tyle dobrze określone, że rozsądną idealizacją wydaje się być hipoteza,
iż wszyscy użytkownicy języka przyporządkowują wyrażeniom te same znaczenia.
Ten sposób ujmowania semantyki stosowano również do wyjaśnienia komunikacyj-
nej funkcji języka. Tradycyjne podejście do uczenia się, które nazywamy uczeniem
przez rozpoznawanie, pokazuje, jak zuniformizowana semantyka może powstać w
warunkach, gdy uczeń dostosowuje się do narzuconego z zewnątrz, niezmiennego
standardu semantycznego. Wymienione podejścia do semantyki zaowocowały wie-
loma interesującymi odkryciami i praktycznymi zastosowaniami.
Wydaje się jednak, że wizja zuniformizowanej semantyki nie zawsze jest zgodna
z faktami. Przedstawiamy wybrane świadectwa na rzecz wewnątrzjęzykowego syn-
chronicznego zróżnicowania semantyki. Zróżnicowanie to polega na współistnieniu
w danej społeczności językowej nierównoważnych znaczeń tych samych wyrażeń. Na
podstawie podanych świadectw odchodzimy od wizji zuniformizowanej semantyki
oraz uczenia przez rozpoznawanie, które jest ściśle powiązane ze statycznym ujmo-
waniem znaczenia. Ponadto, uczenie przez rozpoznawanie wydaje się nieadekwatne
w zastosowaniu do sytuacji, których nie da się opisać za pomocą tradycyjnego roz-
różnienia nauczyciel-uczeń.
By wyjaśnić, jak możliwa jest komunikacja w obrębie semantycznie niejednorod-
nej społeczności, której członkowie charakteryzują się dowolnie ustalonym autoryte-
tem, podajemy mechanizm uczenia przez uzgadnianie, pozwalający na przetwarze-
nie napływająych komunikatów wraz z uwzględnieniem autorytetu ich nadawców.
Zaproponowany mechanizm badamy w odniesieniu do problemu uczenia się seman-
tyki kwantyfikatorów proporcjonalnych. Rozważania ograniczamy do symetrycznej
komunikacyji między dwoma osobnikami. Pokazujemy, jak reprezentować uzgadnia-
nie za pomocą łańcuchów Markowa. Na tej podstawie tej możemy zaobserwować
rozmaite matematyczne zależności między możliwością uzgodnienia semantyki, po-
ziomami autorytetu rozmówców oraz złożoności sytuacji komunikacyjnych.
Ponadto, badamy pewne konstrukcje języka naturalnego, które wyrażają istnie-
nie różnego rodzaju podobieństw między częściowymi porządkami. Podajemy przy-
kłady zdań języka naturalnego oraz ich możliwe formy logiczne, które stwierdzają
istnienie homomorfizmu, zanurzenia, itp. Konstrukcje interpretujemy w terminach
uogólnionych kwantyfikatorów poliadycznych. Badamy definiowalność tak zdefinio-
wanych kwantyfikatorów w logice elementarnej nad odpowiednimi modelami skoń-
czonymi. Jako że kwantyfikatory te są definiowalne w egzystencjalnej części logiki
drugiego rzędu, pytamy o ich zupełność w klasie NP . Dowodzimy, że tylko kwanty-
fikator wyrażający homomorfizm jest praktycznie obliczalny, natomiast pozostałe
są NP -zupełne. W części bardziej filozoficznej, dyskutujemy, jakie wnioski płyną z
tych badań dla lingwistyki oraz zarysowujemy pewne związki między złożonością
obliczeniową, przetwarzaniem informacji przez ludzi i lingwistyką ewolucyjną.
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Said Yate Fulham: “And just how do you arrive at that remarkable
conclusion, Mr. Mayor?”
“In a rather simple way. It merely required the use of that much-
neglected commodity - common sense. You see, there is a branch of
human knowledge known as symbolic logic, which can be used to prune
away all sorts of clogging deadwood that clutters up human language.”
“What about it?” said Fulham. “I applied it. Among other things, I
applied it to this document here. I didn’t really need to for myself be-
cause I knew what it was all about, but I think I can explain it more
easily to five physical scientists by symbols rather than by words.”
Hardin removed a few sheets of paper from the pad under his arm and
spread them out. “I didn’t do this myself, by the way,” he said. “Muller
Holk of the Division of Logic has his name signed to the analyses, as
you can see.”
Pirenne leaned over the table to get a better view and Hardin contin-
ued: “The message from Anacreon was a simple problem, naturally, for
the men who wrote it were men of action rather than men of words. It
boils down easily and straightforwardly to the unqualified statement,
when in symbols is what you see, and which in words, roughly trans-
lated, is, ‘You give us what we want in a week, or we take it by force.’ ”
There was silence as the five members of the Board ran down the line
of symbols, and then Pirenne sat down and coughed uneasily.
Hardin said, “No loophole, is there, Dr. Pirenne?”
“Doesn’t seem to be.”
“All right.” Hardin replaced the sheets. “Before you now you see a copy
of the treaty between the Empire and Anacreon - a treaty, incidentally,
which is signed on the Emperor’s behalf by the same Lord Dorwin who
was here last week - and with it a symbolic analysis.”
The treaty ran through five pages of fine print and the analysis was
scrawled out in just under half a page. “As you see, gentlemen, some-
thing like ninety percent of the treaty boiled right out of the analysis
as being meaningless, and what we end up with can be described in
the following interesting manner:
“Obligations of Anacreon to the Empire: None!
“Powers of the Empire over Anacreon: None!”
— Isaac Asimov, Foundation, 1951

Preface
This dissertation is devoted to the problem of learning natural language
semantics and is primarily focused on semantics of quantifiers. The general
ideas underlying our approach may be familiar to the audience coming from
research in evolutionary linguistics. However, these ideas are less likely to be
familiar to logicians or philosophers.
The approach we present here is not congruent with a quite common
acknowledgement of the existence of fixed, purely linguistic meanings of the
expressions of natural language. According to this traditional claim, natural
language semantics may be described in an orderly fashion by ascribing to
linguistics constructions their well determined meanings.
It was quite a challenge for me, a person so deeply entrenched in the
tradition, to abandon this conviction and accept a totally different view of
language that was first presented to me three years ago by Marcin Mostowski
who, not accidentally, is the supervisor of this thesis. Now, when this new
view of language seems so familiar to me, it is difficult to comprehend how
could I be so mistaken.
The crucial idea lying behind this thesis is simple as that: there is no such
a thing as semantics of natural language in the traditional sense. Semantics
should be viewed as a system of individuated meanings distributed among
members of the language community. These meanings, conceived as algo-
rithms for computing denotations of linguistic constructions, enable speakers
to effectively use language in particular situations of usage and convey infor-
mation to others. However, if each interlocutor has different understanding
of language, how they are going to communicate? Well, this is exactly the
story you can read about on subsequent pages.
Computational results from Chapter II have been obtained in collabora-
tion with Michał Tomasz Godziszewski [Kalociński and Godziszewski, 2016].
Results from Chapter III have been published in [Kalociński et al., 2015].
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I
The Problem of Learning Semantics
I.1 Introduction
Alfred Tarski laid foundations for the scientific approach to semantics. His
semantic theory of truth for formalized languages [Tarski, 1933] shows how
one may define and use semantic notions without the risk of falling into
paradoxes. One of the crucial concepts employed in Tarki’s work is that of
interpretation of a language. A language, understood as a set of meaningless
symbols, is mapped to appropriate objects from a given universe of discourse.
A familiar picture is that of elementary logic where each individual constant
is mapped to a distinguished element, function symbol to a function and
predicate to a relation. This mapping, referred to as interpretation, gives
each symbol a unique meaning. This formalism enables us to extend the
notion of meaning to sentences. Given a definition of truth for sentences
of the language, one may identify the meaning of a given sentence with its
truth-conditions, namely the class of models under which the sentence is
true.
This idea of language and meaning has been adopted by some logically
oriented theories of natural language and proved to be useful in answering
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various question related to semantics.
A great deal of research on natural language semantics abstracts away
from actual language use, as it was initially proposed in [de Saussure, 1916],
and investigates language in isolation. However, if language is put in its
natural environment consisting of communicating language users then the
picture becomes more complicated. One of the main problems is how different
language users are able to understand each other in natural language. The
overall process of communication is very complicated. Our focus is on the
semantic aspect of this problem.
It has been often hypothesised that speakers are equipped with com-
mon semantic rules and they are able to communicate precisely in virtue
of this commonality (and other mechanisms responsible for production, vo-
calization, interpretation, etc.). We discuss this view in Section I.2 where
we formulate the Uniform Semantics Thesis (Thesis 1) according to which
competent speakers of a given language community share the same mapping
between linguistic constructions and meanings. This gives an easy account
for linguistic communication. We also provide some rationale that the uni-
form view of semantics was a rather commonly accepted idealisation and
present some explicit formulations of the thesis from the literature.
The Uniform Semantics Thesis does not touch upon the problem of how
this commonality in semantics may actually be achieved. Some rescue comes
from the concept of learning by allowing language users to adopt the seman-
tics from other speakers. Traditionally, language learning is conceived as a
process of adopting an externally imposed standard. In the case of semantics,
this process is usually modelled in terms of a hypothetical learning mecha-
nism which enables a subject to eventually internalize the correct meanings
by mere observation of language use (see, e.g., [Gierasimczuk, 2007,Pianta-
dosi et al., 2012]). This type of learning, which we call learning by recog-
nizing, gives an answer about how the commonality in semantics may be
achieved. Learning by recognizing is tightly connected with the Uniform Se-
mantics Thesis – one may hypothesise that the overall process of learning
within a community consists in acquiring correct semantic conventions from
competent speakers. We discuss learning by recognizing in Section I.3
Section I.4 is devoted to the criticism of both uniformity of semantics
and learning by recognizing. We provide some evidence of the fact that lan-
guage users may systematically employ non-equivalent interpretations of the
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same expressions in the same context (Section I.4). We call this phenomenon
synchronic semantic variation. Based on this evidence, we reject Thesis 1
(Section I.5) and discuss a weaker claim according to which in some cases
a uniform description of semantics may serve as an approximation of the
semantics of a given language community. We also observe that the aban-
donment of the uniform view of semantics has negative consequences for
learning by recognizing (Section I.5). If a language community manifests
significant semantic variation then learners encounter inconsistent linguistic
usage. Traditional learning mechanisms are not well suited for handling such
data.
In Section I.6 we shortly present another approach which we refer to
as learning by coordination. The crucial assumption of this approach is the
abandonment of the uniform semantics – there is no distinguished, exter-
nally imposed semantic standard. To account for linguistic communication
within community which is allowed to manifest semantic variation, we need
a different leaning mechanism, capable of handling inconsistent responses
from other speaker and allowing adaptation of the individuated meanings so
that efficient communication becomes possible. At the end of this chapter
we mention various approaches from evolutionary linguistics where a very
similar ideas of language learning have first originated.
I.2 Uniform Semantics Thesis
Consider a language community, i.e., a group of speakers who effectively
use natural language for communication purposes. The simplest analysable
fragment of communication within such a community is a single interaction
between two individuals: the speaker and the hearer. For the sake of exam-
ple, assume the speaker wants to draw attention of the hearer to a particular
object of the shared context. The speaker picks up an expression which,
according to the meaning he associates with this expression, refers to the
intended object from the context. He conveys this expression to the hearer
by producing an utterance. The utterance is interpreted by the hearer ac-
cording to the meaning he assigns to the received expression. Finally, the
communication is considered successful if the expression, as interpreted by
the hearer, points exactly to the same object as the speaker has in mind.
The problem which arises in this simple situation is as follows: how the
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speaker and the hearer are able to communicate successfully? One of the
simplest answers to this question, which has been often formulated, is that
the speaker’s and the hearer’s meanings are the same. Obviously, this expla-
nation, if not counting other factors which may intervene in communication
(errors, implicatures, noise, etc.), gives an easy explanation of communica-
tion in natural language. In general, it seems that this sort of account has
been often generalized to the whole language community, which leads to the
following thesis:
Thesis 1 (Uniform Semantics Thesis) The semantics of a given language
used by a community for communication purposes at a given time may be
described in terms of an association between expressions and their meanings
which is shared by all members of the community.
At this point we should make a reservation that Thesis 1 cannot be taken
literally. Similarly to hypotheses from other scientific fields, one may treat
it as an idealisation. Its idealistic character consists in putting down the
occurrence of anomalous data to factors which do not contradict the thesis
itself. In other words, if some facts turned out to be incompatible with this
explanation then we would search for additional causes, not connected to
semantic variation. A familiar example of an idealisation is the claim the
actual meaning the natural language quantifier some corresponds to the
meaning of the logical meaning of the existential quantifier. However, quite
often some is used in such a way that the right interpretation is some but not
all, as it may be the case with the sentence I ate some pie. This may seem as
an evidence against the aforementioned claim, as our linguistic practice shows
that some has two meanings, not one. However, this inconsistency may be
resolved by the appeal to Grice’s conversational maxims [Grice, 1975] which
provide separate explanation for this apparently anomaly.1
Note that Thesis 1 is compatible with various well know semantic prop-
erties of natural languages such as ambiguity, polysemy, homonymy, context
dependence, etc. For example, the fact that a given expression is ambiguous
may be represented by a mapping from this expression to a set of its distinct
meanings. Context dependency roughly means that the right interpretation
1Another familiar example of an idealisation is the law of universal gravity which
predicts that all objects fall at the same rate. Deviation form the expected behaviour may
be explained by positing additional factors such as air resistance.
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of an utterance may be identified only when provided enough contextual
information. For example the sentence I went to the bank is context depen-
dent as it cannot be assigned any interpretation unless we are given enough
information such as the identity of the speaker and whether the speaker is
referring to a financial institution or a riverside. However, the word bank
has two conventional meanings which, when included in the shared uniform
semantics, are disambiguated in the presence of a particular context.2
I.2.1 Acknowledgement of Uniform Semantics
It this subsection we provide some rationale for the claim that the uniform
view of natural language semantics might have been quite commonly ac-
cepted in the twentieth century. Let us start with a short reminder about
approaches which are primarily concerned with the synchronic descriptions
of natural languages.
Synchronic descriptions abstract away from the actual language use and
therefore enclose various properties of natural language in a uniform system
underlying the actual performance of the speakers from a given time. Syn-
chronic approach to the analysis of natural language has become influential
through the works of early structuralists (see, e.g., [de Saussure, 1916]). This
approach, referred to as synchronic linguistics, was a dominating paradigm
of the twentieth century and overshadowed the earlier diachronic approaches
from the nineteenth century. The so-called logical theory of language, in-
spired by the successes of logic [Russell and Whitehead, 1910] and logical
semantics [Tarski, 1933], has strengthened the position of the synchronic
view of language, especially among logicians and philosophers. One of the
first examples of such studies, concerned with an analysis of conversational
language in terms of logical forms for various natural language construc-
tions, may be found in in the last chapter of [Reichenbach, 1947]. This and
further work along these lines have inspired a great deal of researchers in-
terested in the analysis of natural language. We are not to give a histori-
cal survey here, but let us mention at least a few contributions. The idea
that the semantic theory of natural language should be given a form of a
theory of truth has been advocated in [Davidson, 1967]. The mathematical
turn in linguistics [Chomsky, 1957] laid foundations for a formal descrip-
2Sometimes such examples are treated as homonymy.
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tion of the linguistic competence and clearly delineated syntax and seman-
tics in the analysis of natural language. Logical semantics and generative
linguistics have been heavily employed in the linguistic literature [Vasiliu,
1981]. The model-theoretic approach presented in [Peters and Westerståhl,
2006] analyses in detail many logical properties of natural language quan-
tifiers whose meanings are represented in terms of generalized quantifiers
theory [Lindström, 1966]. Approaches developed in this vein have been very
fruitful, resulting in a wealth of practical applications, e.g., in dialogue sys-
tems, automated reasoning, information retrieval and search. A refined view
on semantics conceives meanings as algorithms for computing denotations of
expressions [Tichy, 1969,Suppes, 1980] (see also [Szymanik, 2016]).
It seems that the wide acknowledgement of the uniform view of semantics
is visible in the vivid and widespread reaction to the Quine thesis on inde-
terminacy of translation [Quine, 1960]. Indeed, this «has been among the
most widely discussed and controversial theses in modern analytical philos-
ophy» [Wright, 1997]. Quine considers a problem of constructing a transla-
tion manual for an unknown language by observing linguistic usage of native
speakers and rejects an absolute standard of right and wrong in doing so.
Observe that if semantics of natural language is conceived as system which
may be different from speaker to speaker then the Quine thesis is trivial.
Obviously, no translation would work all the time, as there would be no well
determined meanings of expressions among native speakers. However, if se-
mantics of natural language is conceived as uniform from speaker to speaker
then the Quine thesis becomes non-trivial and very controversial. The Quine
thesis was in fact considered as non-trivial. It seems that this provides some
rationale for the claim that at that time the uniform view of semantics was
a rather commonly accepted conviction, for otherwise the Quine thesis could
have been rejected on the more fundamental grounds.
The claim as to the wide acknowledgement of the existence of fixed,
purely linguistic meanings of the expressions of natural language is expressed
in [Stanosz, 1974a]. According to Stanosz, this claim is accepted by logicians,
whose education is shaped by research in formalized languages. Moreover, it
is accepted, at least tacitly, by practical linguists such as language teachers,
the authors of dictionaries, etc. Stanosz writes: «When they coin definitions,
or find the synonymity of expressions, they affirm the conviction that nat-
ural language can be described semantically in a general manner, and not
11
only in particular instances of the usage of its expressions». This claim was
true in the twentieth century and to all appearances it remains true in the
early twenty first century. According to [Wacewicz et al., 2016] contemporary
academic teaching hardly touches upon recent developments in evolutionary
linguistics and is still performed within the traditional, out-dated paradigms
and largely inadequate conceptual frameworks. Textbooks are mostly con-
cerned with traditional synchronic linguistics approaches aimed at descrip-
tions of grammar and sound structure of natural languages. This fact renders
the wide acknowledgement of Thesis 1 as highly plausible.
Quantifiers and their denotations. There are various ways of defining
uniform association between expressions and meanings. One of the problems
in giving such an association is that we need a way to represent meanings.
Let us mention approach presented in [Peters and Westerståhl, 2006] where
the connection between natural language quantifier expressions and their
meanings is presented in a clear and intuitive way. Meanings of quantifier
expressions are modelled as generalized quantifiers. In the first approxima-
tion one may say that a generalized quantifier is a relation between sets of
individuals (see Chapter II, Definition 2). The association between quantifier
expressions and generalized quantifiers is referred to as the relation of de-
noting. Consider simple quantified sentences: All boys entered the classroom
and No girl watched the movie. Here, quantifier expressions are all and no.
Following [Peters and Westerståhl, 2006], we would say the English no and
the Swedish ingen denote the relation which holds between two sets exactly
when they are disjoint. Similarly, the English all and the Swedish alla de-
note the inclusion relation. Let us consider one example in more detail: All
boys entered the classroom. Given that this sentence is used in a relevant
context, we have two sets, namely the set of boys B and the set of people
who entered the classroom C. Under the assumed interpretation of all, the
sentence in question is true iff B ⊆ C. It seems that this reading overlaps
with the conventional interpretation of all. We refer the reader to [Peters and
Westerståhl, 2006] for more examples and details on this formal approach to
natural language quantification.
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Selected Formulations
In this section we provide excerpts of some authors who give a clear ex-
position of the fundamental assumptions underlying the uniform semantics
approach. Such expositions are rather difficult to find in the literature. This
section may be skipped without loosing the main points of this chapter.
Our examples are drawn from the philosophical and linguistic literature.
It seems that the remarks of Polish authors form an important contribution
in the exposition of assumptions involved in the uniform view of seman-
tics, as they are by far the most clear and explicit. [Stanosz, 1974a] is very
informative. The reader with an acquaintance of Polish may benefit from
reading [Stanosz, 1999] which is a short response to a critique of the logical
concept of language. [Suszko, 1957b] and [Suszko, 1957a], reprinted as a sin-
gle chapter in [Suszko, 1998a], although concerned with an allegedly different
topic, contains a few very informative remarks. In course of the main text, we
recapitulate the most relevant ideas from the Polish articles. We also men-
tion crucial ideas from [Vasiliu, 1972] where the logical theory of language
and linguistics make an unprecedented fusion. Finally, we recapitulate some
remarks from [Dummett, 1975] and [Katz, 1966].
An explicit attempt to defend Thesis 1 may be found in [Stanosz, 1974b].
Stanosz reflects upon the applicability of logical semantics to the analysis
of natural language and tries to defend the view that context-dependence
stays in accordance with the postulate that natural language expressions are
mapped to their systematic meanings. Stanosz says that if we are to explain
visual appearances of the physical solids we need to assign them definite,
ideal shapes. For similar reason, if we are to explain interpretability of ex-
pressions in various contexts we need to assign them ideal meanings. Thesis 1
is formulated even more explicitly in [Stanosz, 1974b] where the logical the-
ory of language is considered as a part of the formal theory language whose
main goal is to explain human linguistic communication.3. The same idea is
formulated in [Suszko, 1957b, Suszko, 1957a] (reprinted in [Suszko, 1998b])
where one can find a clear and simple exposition of the assumptions involved
in modelling human linguistic communication by means of logical semantics.
We shortly present this account as no English translation is available, and
3An independent value of [Stanosz, 1974b] is the presentation of Chomsky’s linguistics
and comparing it with the logical theory of language, especially with semantic theory
proposed by [Katz, 1972].
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as the exposition is straight to the point.
Suszko claims that the communicative functioning of language of a given
group of people is explained by the fact that the expressions of the lan-
guage have some intersubjective meanings for the members of the group.
The existence of such meanings is tightly coupled with the activity of indi-
viduals, especially with the interaction between them and the surrounding
reality (unfortunately, Suszko does not develop the idea about the role of in-
dividuals any further). It is ascertained that the fundamental and necessary
condition of the communicative function of language, and thus of intersub-
jectivity of the meaning of its expressions, is a fixed semantic function of
language. Suszko explains this in a more detail as follows. Let L be a formal
language which serves as an abstract formalisation of the natural language
of a given community A. Suszko assumes there is a model M of L such that
each expression of L is assigned by M exactly the same semantic function
as it has in the real communication between the members of A.4 Suszko
proposes to refer to such a model as to the proper model of L for the lan-
guage community A. It is obvious that such a reconstruction of the human
linguistic competence, assumed to be shared by all members of A, implies
Thesis 1 as this is exactly how the interpretation works in model theory:
each extra-logical symbol is unequivocally paired with its fixed denotation.
Now, following [Stanosz, 1974b], one knows what information is conveyed by
a sentence because one knows the interpretation of extra-logical expressions,
the truth value of atomic sentences and how the truth value of compound
sentences depends on the truth value of their components.
Another exposition of Thesis 1, accompanied with a direct linguistic mo-
tivation, may be found in [Vasiliu, 1972] where the author merges trans-
formational grammar [Katz and Fodor, 1963] and symbolic logic [Carnap,
1958] in order to give a general form of a semantic theory of some frag-
ments of natural language.5 A system of this kind includes a formalized
language which is understood as a translation of a given fragment of natu-
ral language. Denotational rules give the meaning of extra-logical symbols.
Vasiliu, following [Carnap, 1947], says the rules in question yield a map-
ping from extra-logical symbols to natural language expressions. Given such
rules each expression and linguistic construction has assigned a well deter-
4For an exposition of the rudiments of model theory, see, e.g., [Mendelson, 2009].
5The Polish reader may benefit if she consults [Vasiliu, 1981].
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mined meaning. For instance, let H,L be 1- and 2-place predicates and x, y
individual variables. Examples of such rules when applied to English, may
be as follows: the logical form of x is a human is H(x) whereas the logi-
cal form of x loves y is L(x, y). These rules give the interpretations of the
predicates H and L. Then the logical form of Everybody loves somebody is
∀x(H(x)⇒ ∃y(H(y)∧L(x, y)). Another type of semantic rules is concerned
with the definition of truth, developed in the spirit of [Tarski, 1933] which
enable speakers to derive the truth values of compound sentences (so, for
example, the sentence Everybody loves somebody is true if and only if its
logical form is a true sentence under the interpretation given by the logical
forms of the predicates H and L). It seems Vasiliu assumes that everyday
language expressions have well defined systematic meanings which he is able
to ascribe to the extra-logical symbols of a formal language. This is quite in
accordance with the intended meaning of Thesis 1.
Let us mention also some remark form [Katz, 1966]. Katz considers a
situation of conveying a message by the speaker. A message is «encoded in
the form of a phonetic representation of an utterance by means of the system
of linguistic rules with which the speaker is equipped». The speaker vocalizes
an utterance which is picked up by the hearer who recognizes the phonetic
representation. This representation is decoded into the same message which
was intended to convey by the speaker. «Hence, because the hearer employs
the same system of rules to decode that the speaker employs to encode, an
instance of successful linguistic communication occurs.»
We summarize this subsection with some remarks from [Dummett, 1975].
Dummett – recapitulating Frege’s arguments in favour of the claim that the
knowledge of the language by the speaker is better explained in terms of
sense and not reference – gives a conditional statement of Thesis 1: «If we
suppose that an account of the use of language in communication demands
that each sentence possesses a common cognitive content for all speakers,
then this argument does provide a ground for ascribing to each expression
a sense constant from speaker to speaker». The advantage of this formula-
tion is that it provides some ground for a description of a plausible cognitive
equipment of language users, an equipment which enables them to commu-
nicate. We shall get back to this issue when introducing algorithmic theory
of meaning which equates the sense of an expression with a procedure for
computing its denotation [Tichy, 1969]. This concept is briefly introduced in
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the next section and extensively employed in on many occasions throughout
this dissertation.
I.3 Learning by Recognizing
Thesis 1 provides a simple explanation about how communication in natural
language is possible. However, it leaves aside a more foundational problem
of how the commonality of semantics may actually be achieved. A natural
approach is to appeal to the concept of learning and show how language
users may adopt the semantics from other speakers and communicate suc-
cessfully later on. Traditionally, language learning is conceived as a process
of adopting an externally imposed standard. In the case of semantics, this
process is usually modelled in terms of a hypothetical learning mechanism
which enables a subject to eventually internalize the correct meanings by
mere observation of language use. This type of learning, which we call learn-
ing by recognizing, gives an answer about how the commonality in semantics
may be achieved.
Sometimes learning is modelled as an interaction between the learner and
the teacher. 6 The teacher knows the semantics to be acquired by the learner
and generates linguistic usage based on the predefined semantic standard. An
important assumption is that the predefined semantics is fixed throughout
learning. The learner, equipped with an appropriate algorithmic mechanism,
observes more and more samples of language use and gradually adapts his
guesses about the underlying semantics so that eventually he is able to stabi-
lize on the right hypothesis which corresponds exactly to the concept being
presented to him. We shall refer to this type of learning as to learning by
recognizing. We justify our terminology by the fact that the learner’s task is
to acquire the ability to recognize the predefined semantic concept.
The research conducted in this vein is largely connected with the algo-
rithmic theory of meaning – a conception according to which the meaning
of an expression may be identified with a procedure for computing its deno-
tation [Tichy, 1969,Suppes, 1980]. If we identify the extension of a sentence
with the class of (finite) models in which this sentence is true, then the mean-
ing of the sentence, conceived as an algorithm, computes the truth value of
6Some models do not mention the teacher. Instead, they employ certain modes of data
presentation.
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the sentence in a given model. The idea of meaning as algorithm has been
widely used and applied in linguistics, philosophy and cognitive science [van
Benthem, 1986, van Benthem, 1987,Mostowski, 1998,Mostowski and Woj-
tyniak, 2004,Moschovakis, 1990,Moschovakis, 2006,Lambalgen and Hamm,
2005,Szymanik, 2016].7
Let us give an illustrative example without going into too much details
which are postponed to Chapters II and III. Consider simple cardinality
quantifiers such as more than k, for any given natural number k. For the
sake of this example, let us observe that for any given k, the denotation of
the quantifier more than k may be identified with the class of finite structures
– call it Q>k – of the form (U,R), where R is a unary relation, such that
for every such structure M = (U,R), M ∈ Q>k iff |R| > k. Let us provide
an intuitive justification of the fact that for each Q>k there is an intuitive
procedure which on input M = (U,R) outputs the answer to the question
whether M ∈ Q>k. An informal justification of this fact is as follows. Fix
k. Use a number variable n for counting. Initially n := 0. Look through
all elements of U one by one. Each time you see an element belonging to
R, increment n. After exhausting the whole (finite) universe, output yes, if
n > k, and no otherwise.
The concept of meaning as algorithm suits well in the context of learning.
Usually, the idea is that the learner is an algorithmic procedure which is fed
with incoming samples of language use and outputs hypotheses which are
often also algorithmic procedures (or some other computational formalisms
such as grammars or automata). To translate this into the aforementioned
cardinality quantifiers, let the hypotheses available to the learner be vari-
ous algorithms for computing such quantifiers. Fix a cardinality quantifier
Q –this is going to be the predefined semantic concept to be acquired by
the learner. Incoming samples of language use are models M = (U,R) such
that M ∈ Q. This is so-called positive presentation (we employ this mode
of presentation for simplicity reasons). The learner observes more and more
samples. To learn the concept being presented, the learner may use the fol-
lowing algorithm. Let (U1, R1), . . . , (Ut, Rt) be the sample observed so far.
Keep as a current hypothesis the algorithm which computes Q>k, where
k = min{|Ri| : i = 1, 2, . . . , t} − 1. Of course, if each M ∈ Q is presented at
some point, the learner will stabilize on the correct hypothesis.
7This idea goes back to [Frege, 1892].
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There have been many approaches to learning which fall within this cat-
egory. They are mostly inspired by the identifiability in the limit framework,
introduced in [Gold, 1967]. The research conducted in this and related frame-
works has provided us with a plethora of interesting models of learning as well
as theoretical and practical insights (see, e.g., [Tiede, 1999,Costa Florêntio,
2002,Gierasimczuk, 2007,Clark, 2010,Piantadosi et al., 2012]).
Observe that learning by recognizing is tightly connected to Thesis 1.
One may hypothesise that the overall process of learning semantics within a
community consists in acquiring by unskilled speakers the correct semantic
conventions from competent language users. This concept of learning roughly
corresponds to our intuitive idea of what does it mean to learn language. It
simply consists in acquiring the skill of the right usage of linguistic expres-
sions by observing competent speakers which represent the standard of right
and wrong in semantics. Learning by recognizing may be an adequate model
of learning natural language semantics if applied to scenarios which satisfy
the underlying assumptions, namely a clear distinction between learners who
are to adapt and teachers who hold the uniform semantic standard.
I.4 Synchronic Semantic Variation
In this section we present some evidence against Thesis 1. We show that
the semantics of a given language community at a given time may not be
uniform. Non-uniformity of semantics may be understood as the existence
of different speakers that use significantly different meanings for the same
expressions in the same context. We refer to this phenomenon as interindi-
vidual synchronic semantic variation. Another possible variation, referred to
as intrandividual, occurs at the level of one language user – on different occa-
sions the same speaker uses the same expression in exactly the same context
in non-equivalent ways.
First we observe that the discussion on the meaning of the Hintikka
sentence undermines the reliability of linguistic intuitions in this particular
case. We mention a more promising methodology, namely experimentation
with linguistic usage which overcomes (at least to some extent) the problems
linguistic intuitions. Next, we give some theoretical support for the hypoth-
esis that semantic change implies synchronic variation [Kay, 1975] Lastly,
we discuss experiments in color naming which show that even such basic
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expressions reveal a surprising within-language semantic diversity.
I.4.1 Problems with Linguistic Intuitions
The discussion on the meaning of the Hintikka sentence begins with the so
called Hintikka thesis [Hintikka, 1973] according to which an adequate in-
terpretation of sentences such as Some relative of each villager and some
relative of each townsman hate each other requires branching quantification
(Hintikka considers also other examples).8. The Hintikka thesis has provoked
a lively debate in philosophical and linguistic journals (see, e.g., [Guenthner
and Hoepelman, 1974,Gabbay and Moravcsik, 1974, Fauconnier, 1975, Ste-
nius, 1976,Hintikka, 1976,Barwise, 1979]). To get the gist of the discussion
see [Barwise, 1979,Mostowski, 1994,Mostowski and Wojtyniak, 2004].
The debate is concerned with the correct logical form of the Hintikka and
Hintikka-like sentences. The discussion reveals that linguistic intuitions of
various authors diverge as they assign different, non-equivalent logical forms
to the same linguistic construction. Moreover, many authors seem to adhere
to the claim that there is one correct interpretation of the discussed sentence.
Those reports, when taken together, are inconsistent. Certainly, they cannot
be all true. Hence, the question is which of them are true. If we abandon the
view that the Hintikka sentence have one systematic meaning across native
speakers then the reported intuitions provide an evidence of within-language
semantic variation (and evidence against Thesis 1). If we are to save the
uniqueness of meaning across speakers then some reports about the logical
form of the Hintikka sentence are false. It seems that there is little hope
for advancement in this matter by further appeal to mere intuition. The
reliability of this source of knowledge seems to be limited in this case.
I.4.2 Testing Linguistic Usage
Interestingly, the discussion on the meaning of the Hintikka sentence gives
rise to a more direct empirical approach to the problem. [Barwise, 1979]
reports on an experiment which consists in performing a model-checking
8Branching quantifiers [Henkin, 1961] strengthen the expressive power of elementary
logic. In the early seventies, the so called first-order thesis – according to which natural
language sentences have logical forms expressible in elementary logic – was considered
reasonable. Extensive defence of this thesis may be found in [Quine, 1970] Now, this thesis
is rather commonly rejected.
19
task by individual human subjects. An instance of the task is composed
of two elements: the Hintikka sentence and a graphical representation of a
finite model with a precise interpretation of non-logical symbols. Instances
of the task are given to human subjects who are asked to answer whether
a given sentence is true in a given model. The Barwise test is an important
step forward as it bypasses the appeal to intuitions and relies on a different
cognitive task: the truth-value judgement (verification).
According to Barwise, the majority of participants of his experiment ac-
cept the Hintikka sentence in models where only the linear interpretation of
the Hintikka sentence is true, whereas the branching interpretation is false.
Hence, the test shows that there are different language users which output
different truth values for exactly the same task. The question is what are the
sources of the lack of complete unanimity. One of the possible explanations
is that differences result from processing errors during verification. Observe
that this explanation renders it plausible that the meanings are actually
shared. Another possible explanation is simple as that – the meaning of the
Hintikka sentence is not fully shared. In other words, there are individuals
who ascribe different meanings to the sentences under investigation. If this
explanation is correct the strong reading of Thesis 1 must be rejected. In-
terestingly, based on his experiment, Barwise concludes that the Hintikka
thesis is false. The reasoning behind this conclusion seems to be as follows.
We are satisfied with high unanimity between informants (not necessarily a
full one). In other words, we allow for negligible amount of deviations. Suffi-
cient amount of informants outputs answers incompatible with the Hintikka
thesis. Hence, the thesis is false.9 Formulated in this way, the conclusion
drawn by Barwise is still in accordance with Thesis 1. Nevertheless, the re-
sults of the Barwise test render Thesis 1 a bit doubtful and certainly open
new ways in empirical investigations of semantics.
The first hypothesis that the semantics of the Hintikka sentence may be
ambiguous (contrary to previous intuitions reported in the discussion) was
formulated in [Mostowski, 1994]. Mostowski hypothesised that the inferential
and referential meaning of the Hintikka sentence may be actually different.
This hypothesis was based on the observation that there are good arguments
9Further experiments [Gierasimczuk and Szymanik, 2009] show that informants tend
to interpret Hintikka-like sentences in a way consistent with a previously unforeseen linear
interpretation (so-called two-way interpretation). This provides another counter-argument
to the Hintikka thesis.
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for the Hintikka thesis coming from inferential contexts and – at the same
time – experimental evidence against it, coming from verification tasks. This
is quite a peculiar intra-individual semantic variation. It depends essentially
on the kind of the task a human subject is to perform with a sentence. If
involved in inference, she uses one meaning. If performing verification, she
employs another one.
Since [Mostowski and Wojtyniak, 2004] and other works on semantic
complexity, it has slowly become evident that there are other important
factors which may drastically shape the semantics of natural language con-
structions. Mostowski and Wojtyniak show that the problem of recognizing
the truth value of the Hintikka sentence in finite models is NP -complete.
Following their complexity results, the authors present some reasonable hy-
potheses, namely that P 6= NP and that real time cognitive capacities of the
human mind are limited to PTIME-computable functions (see also [Frix-
ione, 2001,van Rooij, 2008]). Based on this, they conclude that the Barwise
test simply could not be solved by human informants if they use semantics
compatible with the Hintikka thesis. The results from [Mostowski and Woj-
tyniak, 2004] lead to an interesting hypothesis, namely that language users
may unexpectedly switch between non-equivalent interpretations of the same
construction depending on whether they perform inference task or a difficult
verification task. A more extensive discussion of this observation, though
concerned with a different example, is presented in Chapter II.
I.4.3 Kay’s Principle
The claim according to which a within-language semantic diversity actually
takes place may be inferred from the synchronic empirical data. This sort of
reasoning is in line with the principle formulated by Kay in the context of
color terms: «diachronic change implies synchronic variation» [Kay, 1975].
Intuitively, the argument goes as follows. Suppose we have two synchronic
descriptions of the same language from two different time periods. Assume
some fragment of the language underwent a semantic change between these
two periods. Taking a reasonable assumption that a semantic change is not
a one-step process but rather a gradual one, we infer that between the two
observed periods, language manifested a significant semantic diversity, at
least with respect to expressions which eventually changed their meaning.
This idea can be made more precise by investigating the proportion of
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language users which ascribe a particular meaning to a given expression.
For the sake of simplicity, suppose we have two different meanings m1 and
m2 and one expression that has undergone a semantic change. At time t all
speakers of a given community use m1 whereas later, at some time t′ > t all
speakers use m2 instead m1. Since conventions spread through communica-
tion between members of the community, we may posit that the semantic
change is a gradual process consisting of adopting the new convention m2
by more and more language users. We may visualize this process by plotting
the proportion of the adherents of the new meaning in moments between t
and t′. If the population is large, we can make an idealistic assumption that
the resulting plot is a continuous function. Hence, by the intermediate value
theorem, for every p ∈ [0, 1] there is a point in time s ∈ [t, t′] such that the
proportion of adherents of m2 is equal to p. What it actually means is that
there is a period of time between t and t′ such that the two meanings co-exist
resulting in a within-language semantic variation.
I.4.4 Color Terms
Amore direct evidence of synchronic semantic variation is presented in [Lind-
sey and Brown, 2009] where the authors investigate the semantics of color-
naming terms in the languages examined during the World Color Survey
(WCS) (http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/wcs). WCS database gathers se-
mantic information collected from informants of 110 mostly unwritten in-
digenous languages. The analysis reveals that there are a few non-equivalent
color-naming systems (referred to as motifs) which occur in the lexicons
of the WCS informants from all over the world. From our point of view,
a more important result is that most of the WCS languages exhibit a sig-
nificant internal semantic variation. In other words, multiple motifs coexist
within majority of each of these languages. In more illustrative terms, given
a language with multiple color-naming motifs, there are native speakers of
that language who use the same color terms in a significantly non-equivalent
manners.
A natural question to ask is what is the reason for such semantic varia-
tion. This question cannot be answered with respect to the WCS informants
as the experiment was performed a few decades ago. This is why a new
experiment has been performed with informants being native speakers of
the Somali language. Results are reported in [Brown et al., 2016]. The ex-
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periments have revealed analogous within-language semantic variation: «the
same names are often used in fundamentally different ways and thus, we
infer, have different meanings for different individuals». No significant cor-
relation between the used motif and individual variation in color vision has
been observed. The authors have analysed associations between individual
motifs and various demographic variables: gender, occupation, geographic
location in Somalia, age and the number of years spent in the United States.
Only the effects of age and gender turned out to be significant.
What is the reason for this within-language diversity? One explanation,
considered in [Brown et al., 2016], is that the color lexicon of Somali under-
goes a semantic change. The idea is that at the present stage this fragment
of the Somali language is at the intermediate stage of an ongoing process
of transformation from one motif to another. This, of course, might be the
case, but other explanation may come to mind as well such as the influence of
U.S. culture (where the informants have been living for some time) and the
existence of different dialects in Somalia, associated with different regions.
Brown and colleagues provide convincing arguments against these hypothe-
ses. However, another hypothesis is that different motifs may be associated
with other factors (for example social ones). However, yet another hypoth-
esis is that the semantics of color terms need not be uniform to satisfy the
communication demands of the society and thus the lexicon may divide into
a few non-equivalent ones.
I.5 Abandoning Uniform Semantics
As we have shown in the previous section, there is theoretical and empirical
evidence of significant variation in speakers’ responses resulting from refer-
ential and inferential usage of various natural language expressions. More
importantly, this variation occurs when the expression and corresponding
context remain fixed across different instances of usage.
One may try to resolve this inadequacy by the appeal to the idealistic
character of Thesis 1 and claim that it arises due to mistakes made by lan-
guage users who engage in communication, or some other factors, for example
pragmatic ones (as briefly discussed in Section I.2). However, this seems un-
likely as the experimental settings seem to be constructed in such a way that
they reduce the influence of other factors to the minimum (see, e.g. [Brown
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et al., 2016]). Moreover, the uniform semantics account lead to weird conse-
quences if we consider situations of the ongoing semantic change. Take, for
example, an argument presented in Section I.4.3. If the initial semantics m1
is conceived as the correct semantic standard at time t then at time t′ it is
completely mistaken. We are not likely to say that at time t′ all language
users are mistaken about the right meaning of the underlying expression. A
more reasonable view is that the standard has changed and now, at time t′,
it is m2. However, in between, i.e. after t and before t′, there is actually no
correct uniform semantic description that could serve as an idealisation of
the semantics of the community.
It seems that the evidence shows that divergent responses of informants
come from their adherence to non-equivalent semantic interpretations. This
renders the uniform semantics approach inadequate for the description of
natural language semantics in situations of semantic variation. Moreover,
observe that non-uniform semantics does not have to hinder the communica-
tive functioning of language of the community. It simply may be the case that
communication demands require sufficiently common semantics, not neces-
sarily a completely shared one. Hence, we are likely to admit that universally
shared semantics is does not have be considered as a distinctive feature of
a language community which successfully employs their language in com-
munication purposes. Communication may still work even if the community
manifests some variation. Therefore, we opt to abandon Thesis 1.
Observe that the abandonment of Thesis 1 may be problematic for the
approach of learning by recognizing (Section I.3). If a language community
manifests significant semantic variation then learners frequently encounter
inconsistent samples of language usage. Traditional learning mechanisms are
not well suited for handling such data, as they are constructed to operate
on samples derived from predefined semantics which does not change during
learning. In Section I.3 we have shortly discussed the view according to
which the semantic is learned from competent speakers that are supposed
to represent the uniform semantic standard. However, this approach is also
problematic, as experiments suggest that speakers of the same community
which are likely to be considered as equally competent, are subjected to
semantic variation in the same sense as less competent or unskilled language
users. Moreover, this approach does not take into account communication
phenomena which cannot be captured by the teacher-learner distinction, for
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example interactions between the speakers who consider themselves equally
authoritative and thus may tend to learn from each other.
I.5.1 Uniform Semantics as an Approximation
Intuitively, we are tempted to say that uniform semantics actually provides
an instantaneous picture of natural language semantics. It should be in prin-
ciple possible to say something more about the accuracy of this picture.
The experiments reported in [Barwise, 1979,Gierasimczuk and Szymanik,
2009] and other experimental works exploring the semantic content of natu-
ral languages (see, e.g., [Schlotterbeck and Bott, 2013], probably the earliest
such work is [Lenneberg and Roberts, 1955], a cross-linguistic study con-
cerned with the meanings of color terms in Zuni and English) suggest that
what we can realistically hope for is at most a high degree of unanimity or
conventionality. Certainly not an absolute degree, as the naive reading of
Thesis 1 suggests. The property of high conventionality points to another
approach, different from the strong claim according to which the semantics
is completely shared: uniform semantics is not to be treated as an idealis-
tic assumption but rather as an approximation. And still, this a hypothesis
which may be verified or disproved through experimentation.
Assuming this hypothesis, the approximative version of the Hintikka the-
sis may be formulated as follows: language users tend to ascribe to the Hin-
tikka sentence the branching interpretation (in referential contexts). Data
from the Barwise test [Barwise, 1979] and the evidence for the two-way
interpretation [Gierasimczuk and Szymanik, 2009] seem to legitimate the re-
jection of the approximative version of the Hintikka thesis and support the
hypothesis that the referential semantics of the Hintikka sentence may by
approximated by a linear reading.
To put our view in more general terms, uniform semantics is sometimes
a useful theoretical approximation of the actual state of the language of a
given community. From a purely theoretical point of view, it seems very un-
likely for a community to enter a pure steady state understood as semantics
shared by every language user. At the other extreme, to little uniformity in
semantics would hinder the communicative efficacy of language, contrary to
our linguistic experience. It seems that a realistic picture is away from these
two extremes and lies somewhere in between and may be characterized by
the sufficient amount of semantic commonalities among the speakers. This
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is how we understand the claim that a synchronic account of language may
serve as an approximation.
I.6 Learning by Coordination
The conclusion which arises from our considerations is that semantics (or
more broadly – language) of a given community is better viewed not in
terms of a universally shared semantics but rather as an system of individ-
ual semantic functions of particular language users who – driven by the need
for effective communication – continuously adapt their current individuated
semantics by taking into account the experience which they obtain through
interaction with other members of the community. Within this picture, se-
mantics may be viewed as an emergent property of the system, a property
which by no means has to take the form prescribed by any predefined seman-
tic standard. In fact, one may think of coordination as if there were many
competing meanings some of which may dominate the population and result
in a widespread convention.
The idea of language as convention is not new to the philosophical in-
quiry. For example, it has been extensively presented in [Lewis, 1969]. Lewis
conceives language as a mapping from expressions to meanings. There are
many possible languages satisfying the communicative needs of a given com-
munity. In game-theoretical terms, members of the community are faced
with a coordination problem – there are many solutions (languages) which
actually solve the underlying problem of communication.10 The Lewis idea
of language as convention seems accurate in positing that language conven-
tions may be viewed as solutions to the communicative coordination problem.
There have been some doubts whether the problem of arriving at common
semantic conventions may be handled by the scientific method [Davidson,
1986,Chomsky, 1986]. However, recent developments in evolutionary linguis-
tics (which we shortly present at the end of this chapter) and the approach
presented in this dissertation (Chapter III) seem to vindicate the claim that
we may approach to this problem in a systematic and rigorous way.
We refer to our approach as to learning by coordination. Its main assump-
10To illustrate this idea on a simple example, consider a traffic coordination problem:
how to move to maintain flow and avoid collisions? Driving on the right is one solution
adopted in Poland. However, there is another solution, namely driving on the left, which
has been adopted in the United Kingdom.
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tion is the abandonment of the claim that there is a distinguished, externally
imposed semantic standard. To account for linguistic communication within
community which is allowed to manifest semantic variation, we need a dif-
ferent leaning mechanism, capable of handling inconsistent responses from
other speakers and various degrees of social influence that speakers may ex-
ert on each other. The mechanism is to be construed in such a way that
it allows for adaptation of individuated meanings and thus makes efficient
communication possible. Learning by coordination seems to shift the "logic"
of uniform semantics to the realm of individual cognitive strategies which,
fuelled with experience obtained via interaction with other speakers, drive
the overall dynamics of interaction to a state which allows for efficient com-
munication.
The approaches similar to ours have been developed since around the
nineties of the twentieth century and are usually referred to as cultural lan-
guage evolution or – more broadly – evolutionary linguistics. According to
a recent survey [Steels, 2011] contemporary research in the subject may be
classified in two categories. One encompasses theories developed within the
paradigm of biolinguistics which investigate language in connection with our
physical, biological, and ecological embodiment. The other one includes ex-
planations which conceive language as a system shaped mainly through vari-
ous cultural forces that come into play during online communication, learning
and language processing. The first successful scientific endeavours in the field
came from artificial intelligence. For example, Steels has formulated a hypo-
thetical agent-based mechanism for the formation and coordination of spatial
terms [Steels, 1995]. Simulations show that the activity of communicating
software agents which adapt according to the specified mechanism results in
the emergence of common lexicons. A major insight from this study is that
language may be viewed as a self-adaptive system. In [Steels and Belpaeme,
2005] we find an approach to coordination of color terms which is based on
an ingenious formalisation and application of the idea of language games and
representation of color categories in terms of radial neural networks.
Other types of language evolution models is iterated learning (see [Kirby
et al., 2014] for a recent survey). Iterated learning paradigm is similar to
learning by recognizing in the respect that both are concerned with learning
from the teacher. However, there is a substantial difference between these
two approaches. Learning by recognizing is primarily concerned with the
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mechanisms of learning which enable a learner to fully accommodate the
semantics of the teacher. In contrary, iterated learning purposely allows for
partial learning – the learner is exposed to linguistic data which is far from
complete. So the model is constrained to account for the poverty of stimu-
lus. However, iterated learning goes even further and arranges teachers and
learners in succession, where the learner from a given iteration becomes a
teacher in the next iteration. Running such iterated simulations for sev-
eral generations allows for observing various properties interesting from the
evolutionary linguistics perspective. For example, one of the first results ob-
tained within this paradigm was the demonstration that compositionality
may emerge through such an iterated learning process [Kirby, 2000].
Recently, there has been a growing interest in a more experimental ap-
proach which was initiated in [Galantucci, 2005]. This empirical approach to
investigating the emergence of novel forms of communication is referred to as
experimental semiotics. The idea is to gather human subjects in laboratory
where they are in a position to communicate with each other in the absence
of any pre-established communicative conventions. This sort of experimen-
tal evidence is an ideal source of knowledge which may fill the gap between
mathematical or computation modelling and natural phenomena. For more
details, we refer the reader to a recent survey [Galantucci and Garrod, 2011].
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II
Complexity of the Barwise Sentence and
Similar Natural Language Constructions
In this chapter we elaborate on selected logical and computational complexity
properties of some everyday language constructions. Our examples are based
on the construction presented in [Barwise, 1979]:
The richer the country the more powerful some of its officials. (1)
Hereinafter, (1) is referred to as the Barwise sentence. Barwise observes
that (1) expresses some way of embedding one ordering to another. Our
constructions are analogous in this respect: they state the existence of various
similarities between partial orderings, such as homomorphism, embedding
and variations of those.
Semantically, we analyse the constructions as polyadic generalized quan-
tifiers which are conceived as appropriate classes of models (see Definition 2
in Section II.1). The quantifiers which correspond to our constructions are
referred to as similarity quantifiers. Our motivation is to provide for them
some initial logical classification. We pursue this task by asking about the
definability of those properties in elementary logic over finite models. Our
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work in this respect contributes to investigations of polyadic quantification
in natural language [van Benthem, 1989,Keenan, 1992,Keenan, 1996,Peters
and Westerståhl, 2006, Szymanik, 2010]. Our examination starts with some
negative definability results which extend the theorem provided in [Barwise,
1979], according to which homomorphism is not expressible in elementary
logic over arbitrary models.
Further questions are concerned with semantic complexity. Our aim to
establish which constructions are tractable. We pursue this line of inves-
tigation in the spirit of algorithmic theory of meaning and semantic com-
plexity of natural language quantifiers [Szymanik, 2016]. We show that the
homomorphism quantifier is tractable, whereas other quantifiers under in-
vestigation are NP -complete. Our results on the complexity of similarity
quantifiers supplement the work on complexity of polyadic quantification
(see, e.g., [Szymanik, 2010]).1
Finally, we discuss how our results relate to empirical investigations about
the influence of semantic complexity on human comprehension. We also make
some remarks about the interplay between semantic complexity of natural
language and evolutionary linguistics.
***
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section II.1 we define some polyadic
generalized quantifiers that appear in everyday language and express the ex-
istence of various kinds of similarities between partial orders. The definitions
are followed by examples of natural language sentences that are deemed to
express the desired properties. In Section II.3 we study definability of similar-
ity quantifiers over finite models. In Section II.4 we provide the complexity
classification. Section II.5 revolves around a more philosophical discussion
and the influence of complexity pressures on semantic preferences of human
subjects. Finally, in Section II.6, we make some remarks on the interplay
between computational complexity, human cognition and evolutionary lin-
guistics.
1Generalized quantifiers were first investigated from the computational perspective
in [Blass and Gurevich, 1986].
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II.1 Similarity Quantifiers
Let σ = (A,<A, B,<B) and σR = (A,<A, B,<B, R) be relational vocabu-
laries, where A, B are 1-place and <A, <B, R are 2-place predicates. We
interpret the symbols so that (A,<A), (B,<B) are strict partial orders on A
and B respectively, and R, called the coupling relation, satisfies R ⊆ A×B
(observe that the required properties are easily expressible in FO). We refer
to such σ-models and σR-models as to double partial orders and coupled
partial orders, respectively. In the present work, we consider models with
finite universes. This restriction seems reasonable in applications to natural
language [Westerståhl, 1984].
One partial order may be similar to another one in various ways. The
similarities we consider are: homomorphism, 1–1 homomorphism and em-
bedding. The following second-order σ-sentences express the existence of ho-
momorphism, 1–1 homomorphism and embedding from (A,<A) to (B,<B):
∃ f : A→ B ∀x, y ∈ A (x <A y ⇒ f(x) <B f(y)) (2a)
∃ f : A 1−1→ B ∀x, y ∈ A (x <A y ⇒ f(x) <B f(y)) (2b)
∃ f : A 1–1→ B ∀x, y ∈ A (x <A y ⇔ f(x) <B f(y)) (2c)
Definition 2 Let t = (n1, n2, . . . , nk) be a k-tuple of positive integers, k > 1.
A Lindström generalized quantifier of type t is an isomorphism-closed class
Q of structures such that if M ∈ Q then M = (U,R1, R2, . . . , Rk), where U
is the universe and Ri is an ni-placed relation on U , for i = 1, 2, . . . , k. A
generalized quantifier of type (n1, n2, . . . , nk) is called polyadic, if ni > 1, for
some 1 6 i 6 k.
Observe that the classes of (finite) double partial orders in which the (2a),
(2b) and (2c) conditions hold are isomorphism-closed. Hence, the respec-
tive classes are generalized quantifiers, hereinafter denoted by H, H1–1, E ,
accordingly. The type of these quantifiers is (1, 2, 1, 2).
The concept of a coupled partial order is richer. The coupling relation
R ⊆ A×B makes it possible to introduce new types of similarities between
partial orders. In what follows, we define similarities that are restricted by
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the coupling relation. Given a coupled partial order, let Ra denote the set
{b ∈ A : R(a, b)}. R induces an indexed family of sets {Ra}a∈R. Let us
formulate the following requirement: for each a ∈ A, the similarity function
is not allowed to assume values outside Ra. In other words, we require that
the similarity function, say f , is such that each a ∈ A is in the relation R
with the value f(a). The following second-order σR-sentences express the
existence of homomorphism, 1–1 homomorphism and embedding that are
restricted by the coupling relation:
∃ f : A→ B ∀x, y ∈ A [R(x, f(x)) ∧ (x <A y ⇒ f(x) <B f(y))] (3a)
∃ f : A 1−1→ B ∀x, y ∈ A [R(x, f(x)) ∧ (x <A y ⇒ f(x) <B f(y))] (3b)
∃ f : A 1–1→ B ∀x, y ∈ A [R(x, f(x)) ∧ (x <A y ⇔ f(x) <B f(y))] (3c)
The classes of (finite) coupled partial orders in which (3a), (3b), (3c) hold are
isomorphism-closed and thus are generalized quantifiers. We denote them by
HF , H1–1F and EF , respectively. The F subscript comes form the first letter
of the word family. The family we have in mind is {Ra}a∈A.
Additionally, we consider a natural condition that may be imposed on R.
We refer to it as to the disjointness condition. It says that Ra ∩Rb = ∅, for
every a, b ∈ A such that a 6= b. This is expressed by
∀x∀y∀x′∀y′(x 6= x′ ∧ R(x, y) ∧ R(x′, y′)⇒ y 6= y′) (disjointness)
If each of the conditions (3a), (3b), (3c) is taken in conjunction with the
disjointness requirement, we obtain the generalized quantifiers which we de-
note by HDF , H1–1DF and EDF , accordingly. The DF subscript comes form
the first letters of the words disjoint family. The type of this quantifiers is
(1, 2, 1, 2, 2). Trivially, HDF = H1–1DF . Observe that EDF might as well be
defined by the conjunction of the disjointness condition and
∃ f : A→ B ∀x, y ∈ A [R(x, f(x)) ∧ (x <A y ⇔ f(x) <B f(y)] (4)
II.2 Examples
We provide everyday language sentences which are interpretable as polyadic
generalized quantifiers defined in Section II.1. We build upon the Barwise
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sentence (see Example 1) [Barwise, 1979]. In the more purely linguistic litera-
ture the structures involved in such sentences are called comparative correla-
tives [Culicover and Jackendoff, 1999,Den Dikken, 2005], comparative condi-
tionals [McCawley, 1988,Beck, 1997] and correlational comparatives [Keenan
and Ralalaoherivony, 2014]. Obviously, some instances of this construction
are first-order:
The richer the country the more powerful its ruler. (5)
Let A stand for countries and B for rulers. Countries are ordered by being
richer <A. Rulers are ordered by being more powerful <B. Let f denote the
function which assigns rulers to countries. The logical form of (5) is
∀x, y ∈ A (x <A y ⇒ f(x) <B f(y)). (6)
If each country has exactly one ruler, (6) is an obvious interpretation. Other-
wise, (6) is acceptable if f , denoted by the noun phrase its ruler, is previously
mentioned or easily identified. Now, consider officials instead of rulers. Each
country has most likely more than one official. Additionally, change the num-
ber of the noun phrase in the second clause to plural:
The richer the country the more powerful its officials. (7)
Interpret A and <A as previously. Let B stand for officials. Officials are or-
dered by being more powerful <B. Let R(x, y) mean that y is an official of
x. Assuming that countries have many officials, the relation R ⊆ A × B is
one-to-many. Given some additional information, one may read (7) as (6),
where the expression its officials corresponds to the already known function
f which assigns officials to countries. If no such information is available, the
meaning of (7) is rather ambiguous. Perhaps, the most natural interpretation
of its officials is all of its officials. Instead of all we may use other quantifier
determiners such as some or most. We restrict our analysis to some. Fur-
ther examples use can to expresses the possibility of certain arrangement of
objects.
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Homomorphism quantifiers
A plausible reading of (1) says we may assign each country one of its of-
ficials in such a way that the richer the country the more powerful is the
assigned official. Logically speaking, (1) reads similarly to (6) except that
f is not a function symbol, but a second-order functional variable, quan-
tified existentially. Additionally, we add the explicit use of R because for
any given country a, f is allowed to assume values only from Ra. Assuming
countries have disjoint sets of officials, the logical form of (1) is (3a) taken
in conjunction with the disjointness condition. Hence, the semantics of (1)
is interpretable as the quantifier HDF .
To drop the disjointness condition, consider the following sentence:
The wiser the professor the smarter some of his students. (8)
Let A stand for professors, B for students and R ⊆ A × B for the relation
of being professors’ student. Professors are partially ordered by being wiser
<A. Students are partially ordered by being smarter <B. A plausible read-
ing of (8) says we may assign each professor one of his students in such a
way that the wiser the professor, the smarter is the assigned student. It is
perfectly possible that two professors have the same students, so the chosen
relation does not force the disjointness of {Ra}a∈A. Ideally, {Ra}a∈A could
be any family of sets of students whatsoever. Hence, the semantics of (8) is
interpretable as the quantifier HF .
To get rid of R and allow the similarity function to assume its values
from the whole B, consider the following sentence:
The smarter the student the wiser some of the professors. (9)
Let A stand for students in one high school (or university) group, B for
professors of this group. Having such a domain of interpretation, assume that
students are partially ordered by being smarter <A. Professors are partially
ordered by being wiser <B. A plausible reading of (9) says one can assign
each student a professor in such a way that the smarter the student, the
wiser the assigned professor. Hence, the semantics of (9) is interpretable as
the quantifier H.
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Injective homomorphism
Two people cannot buy the same product at the same time. The relation of
buying is thus appropriate for obtaining injective homomorphism between
two sets of objects: consumers and products. Consider the following sentence.
The richer the consumer, the better some of the products he can buy. (10)
Let A stand for consumers, B for products. Consumers are partially ordered
by being richer <A. Products are partially ordered by being better <B. A
plausible reading of (10) says each consumer can be assigned a product in
such a way that the assignment is injective and the richer the consumer, the
better is the assigned product. Hence, the semantics of (10) is interpretable
as the quantifier H1–1. To obtain the quantifier H1–1F , we simply add some
relation R which may arbitrarily connect consumers and products:
The richer the consumer, the better some of his favourite (11)
products he can buy.
Embedding quantifiers
Switching from homomorphism to embedding consists on enforcing injectiv-
ity and preserving the ordering in two directions. One approach is to use
anaphoric expressions - imagine that the example below is used by some of
parents of a member of a high school group (during some kind of a parental
small talk), and refers to the group and their teachers:
The smarter the student, the wiser are some of the professors and (12)
whenever these professors are wiser, the students are smarter.
If the anaphoric expression these professors is interpreted as the professors
selected by the similarity function and the students as referring to the argu-
ments of this function, then the semantics of (12) is E . To obtain EF , apply
this trick to sentences like (11). To get a natural example of EDF , consider
a sentence like (11), where the coupling relation induces a disjoint family.
Anaphora allows a wide range of quite natural examples which may result
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in other quantifiers, not formally defined in this paper:
The wiser the professor, the smarter are some of his students, and (13)
whenever these students are smarter, the professors are wiser.
This sentence does not require that the similarity function is injective. A
reasonable reading says there is function from professors to students which
respects the ordering in both directions and such that for any given professors
the value of the function belongs to the set of his students.
There is another way to guarantee that the ordering is preserved in both
directions. In some contexts, the adverb exactly is used for expressing the
fact that the information we are giving is precise. For example, exactly may
express the equivalence when used in the context of implication. When we
say that the objects of type A are the objects of type B, we say that for
every object x, if x is of type A then x is of type B. However, if we say that
objects of type A are exactly the objects of type B, we mean that for every
object x, x is of type A if and only if x is of type B. Since two-way order
preservation is essentially expressed by the equivalence, we may simply use
exactly to obtain E :
Those consumers, who can buy better products, are exactly (14)
the richer ones.
To get EDF , we use the disjointness condition to enforce injectivity:
Those countries, some of whose officials are more powerful, (15)
are exactly the richer ones.
One may dispute whether the logical form of (15) is precisely (3c) in
conjunction with the disjointness condition. The explicit requirement that
the similarity function is injective (as it is expressed in (3c)) seems to strong.
However, the injectivity is enforced by the coupling relation R ⊆ A×B which
induces a disjoint family {Ra}a∈R. The semantics we obtain is extensionally
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the same as EDF . To get EF , we cannot relay on the disjointness condition:
Those professors, some of whose students are smarter, (16)
are exactly the wiser ones.
The semantics of (16) is not EF . (16) does not require that the similarity
function is injective. For example, consider a model consisting of two profes-
sors incomparable with respect to their wisdom. Assume there is only one
student who is taught by the two professors. (16) is true in such a model.
However, this model does not belong to EF . To obtain EF , we use a statement
which requires injectivity:
Those consumers, who can buy better products they like, (17)
are exactly the richer ones.
Let A, B, <A and <B be interpreted as in the case of (10). Let R ⊆ A×B
connect consumers with the products they like. A plausible reading of (17)
says each consumer can be assigned a product he likes in such a way that
the assignment is injective and the ordering is preserved in both directions.
Hence, the semantics of (17) is interpretable as the quantifier EF .
Linear readings
It is perfectly possible that some of the examples from this section, if not
all of them, allow other interpretations. For example, (1) may be read in at
least one of the following ways:
∀x, y ∈ A ∃ z, w ∈ B [x <A y ⇒ (z <B w ∧ R(x, z) ∧ R(y, w))] (18a)
∀x, y ∈ A ∃ z, w ∈ B [R(x, z) ∧ R(y, w) ∧ (x <A y ⇒ z <B w)] (18b)
We may assign similar logical forms to other examples. The difference be-
tween second- and first-order readings becomes apparent in the model from
Figure II.1. A = {a1, a2, a3} are countries, solid arrows represent the ordering
by richeness <A (the richest country is a3). Officials are represented by nat-
ural numbers enclosed in frames. The ordering by power <B is understood
as the standard ordering of natural numbers. Dashed lines connect countries
with their officials. In this model (3a) is false, whereas (18a), (18b) are true.
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a3
R 1,2
a2
R 0,3
a1
R 1
Figure II.1: Second-order vs first-order interpretation.
What about the difference between (18a) and (18b)? Of course, (18b) implies
(18a) but not the other way round (in the model with two countries a1, a2
such that a1 does not have any officials and <R is empty, (18b) is false
whereas (18a) is true). Perhaps this simple example is appropriate to show
that, to all appearances, our intuitions may be inconsistent. One the one
hand, one may argue that the richer the country is the false antecedent of the
implication and thus the entire sentence (1) is true (reading (18a)). On the
other hand, one may believe that (1), when read in its entirety, presupposes
that every country has an official. It seems that our intuition is not the best
advisor in this respect.
II.3 Definability
In this section we study the definability of the generalized polyadic quantifiers
introduced in Section II.1. We show they are not FO-definable over double
and coupled partial orders. We use two techniques from finite model theory:
reductions and locality [Libkin, 2004].
In [Barwise, 1979] one may find a model-theoretical proof that homomor-
phism between partial orders is not FO-expressible over arbitrary models.
In what follows, we prove that
Theorem 3 H, H1–1, E are not expressible in FO over finite double partial
orders.
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Proof: Let Q ∈ {H,H1–1, E}. The proof is by contradiction. Assume Q
is FO-expressible over double partial orders. We show that the parity is
expressible in FO over linear orders. This yields a contradiction as the parity
is not FO-expressible over linear orders [Libkin, 2004].
Let ϕ be a first-order σ-sentence expressing Q. Observe that ϕ contains
occurrences of A and B. Let τ = (<) be a vocabulary of linear orders. We
construct an FO τ -sentence ψ which expresses the parity over linear orders.
Let x be a variable not occurring in ϕ. In what follows, X  Y means that
expression X is to be substituted by expression Y . Construct ψ1(x) and
ψ2(x) by applying to ϕ the substitutions rules (19a) and (19b), respectively:
A(yi) x < yi yi <A zj  x < yi < zj
B(yi) yi < x yi <B zj  yi < zj < x
(19a)
A(yi) yi < x yi <A zj  yi < zj < x
B(yi) x < yi yi <B zj  x < yi < zj
(19b)
Now, let ψ denote the τ -sentence ∃x (ψ1(x) ∧ ψ2(x)). We claim ¬ψ ex-
presses the parity over linear orders. It suffices to observe that ψ expresses
its complement. Observe that ψ says there is an element x such that all el-
ements above x may be homomorphically mapped to all elements below x
and vice versa. Since we work in strict linear orders, it simply means that the
set of all elements above x has the same cardinality as the set of all elements
below x. Hence, together with x, the whole universe is odd. 
Theorem 4 HF , H1–1F , EF are not expressible in FO over coupled partial
orders.
Proof: The argument is almost the same as for the Theorem 3. The only
difference is that we extend (19a) and (19b) with additional rules R(yi, zj) 
x < yi ∧ zj < x and R(yi, zj) yi < x ∧ x < zj , respectively. 
The technique for proving Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 does not apply
easily for showing FO-inexpressibility of the quantifiers HDF , H1–1DF , EDF .
Instead, we use the Hanf-locality technique. We sketch the methodology and
then prove the theorem.
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Let ρ be a relational vocabulary. LetM be a ρ-model. The Gaifman graph
of M is defined as G(M) = (|M |, E), where for every a, b ∈ |M |, E(a, b) iff
a = b or there is a predicate R in ρ such that for some tuple t ∈ RM , a
and b occur in t. The distance dM (x, y) is understood as the length of the
shortest path from x to y in G(M). The ball of radius r around a ∈ |M | is
defined as BrM (a) = {x : dM (a, x) 6 r}. The r-neighborhood of a in M is
the ρ-structure NMr (a) such that:
• the universe is BrM (a),
• each k-ary relation R is interpreted as RM restricted to BrM (a), i.e.
RM ∩ (BrM (a))k.
Now let A and B be two ρ-structures. If there exists a bijection f : A → B
such that for every c ∈ A
NAd (c)
∼= NBd (f(c)),
then we write A d B which means that the two structures locally look the
same. We say that a class of ρ-structures Q is Hanf-local if there exists a
number d > 0 such that for every ρ-structures A and B:
Ad B ⇒ [A ∈ Q⇔ B ∈ Q].
The smallest d for which the above holds is called the Hanf-locality rank of
Q. Using Hanf-locality to proving that a class of structures Q is not definable
in a logic L amounts to proving the every L-definable class of structures is
Hanf-local and that Q is not Hanf-local. It is known that every FO-definable
class of structures is Hanf-local. We use it below. For details on locality,
see [Libkin, 2004].
Theorem 5 The quantifiers HDF , EDF are not FO-expressible over coupled
partial orders.
Proof: The proof is by contradiction. Let Q be one of the above quantifiers.
Assume that Q is FO-expressible over coupled partial orders. Hence, Q is
Hanf-local [Libkin, 2004]. Let Ln, for n > 0, denote the type of strict partial
order in Figure II.2. We call it a bridge. For each n > 0, we define the length
of Ln, denoted by |Ln|, as 2n. Let d be the Hanf-locality rank of Q. Set
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·→·←· repeated n times
Figure II.2: Bridge Ln.
m = min{|Ln| : n > 0 ∧ |Ln| > 2d}. We define two coupled partial orders
C = (A ∪ B,A,<A, B,<B, R) and C′ = (A′ ∪ B′, A′, <A′ , B′, <B′ , R′). We
set |A ∪B| = |A′ ∪B′| = 9m so that |A| = |A′| = 3m and |B| = |B′| = 6m.
(A,<A) is isomorphic with (A′, <A′) and is easily visualized as a triangle,
wherein each face is a bridge of length m. (B′, <B′) consists of two separate
orders (B′1, <B′ B′1) and (B′2, <B′ B′2), both isomorphic to (A,<A). Now,
(B,<B) is easily visualized as a hexagon, wherein each face is a bridge of
length m. To define the relation R, consider the following labelling of the
vertices from A and B. Set i := 1 and choose an arbitrary vertex in A
(B) with two outgoing edges in the ordering <A (<B). This is your current
position. (?) If the current position is not labelled, label it with ai(bi). Change
your current position to the incident vertex in the clockwise direction, set
i := i+ 1 and go to (?).
Set R(ai, bj) iff i = j or j = i + 3m. Observe that Ra ∩ Ra′ = ∅, for
each a, a′ ∈ A such that a 6= a′. To define R′, consider two isomorphisms
f1 : (A
′, <A′) → (B′1, <B′ B′1) and f2 : (A′, <A′) → (B′2, <B′ B′2). Set
R′(a, b) iff f1(a) = b or f2(a) = b. Observe that the family {R′a}a∈A′ is
disjoint. This ends the definition of C and C′.
Define a bijection f : A ∪ B → A′ ∪ B′ as follows. Label A′ with
a′1, a′2, . . . , a′3m, B′1 with b11, b12, . . . , b13m and B′2 with b21, b22, . . . , b23m in the
same way as A with a1, a2, . . . , a3m (see previous paragraph). Set f(ai) = a′i,
f(bi) = b
1
i and f(b3m+i) = b
2
i , for 1 6 i 6 3m.
We prove that Cd C′. Let c ∈ A∪B. We show thatNCd (c) ∼= NC
′
d (f(c)).
Overall, there are at most four isomorphism types of d-neighbourhoods of
points in C and C′. The types correspond to the following conditions (by an
edge we mean <A-edge, <B-edge or R-edge): a) c has 4 out-edges (c ∈ A, c
has 2 out-<A-edges and 2 out-R-edges), b) c has 2 in-edges and 2 out-edges
(c ∈ A, c has 2 in-<A-edges and 2 out-R-edges), c) c has 3 in-edges (c ∈ B,
c has 2 in-<B-edges and 1 in-R-edge), d) c has 1 in-edge and 2 out-edges
(c ∈ B, c has 2 out-<B-edges and 1 in-R-edge). Clearly, these are all possible
immediate surroundings of an arbitrary point c ∈ A∪B in models C and C′.
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a ↘
b→
A B
← b′
B′
A′ B′2
B′1
Figure II.3: Coupled partial orders C and C′ consisting of (A,<A), (B,<B)
and (A′, <A′), (B′, <B′), respectively.
NBd−1(b) b
bl br
NAd (c) c
b′l b
′
r
NBd−1(b
′) b′
<A <B R
Figure II.4: d-neighbourhood of c with 4 outgoing edges, for even d. A =
(A,A,<A) and B = (B,B,<B). The horizontal bridge in the middle is
NAd (c). The top horizontal structure isN
B
d−1(b). The bottom horizontal struc-
ture is NBd−1(b
′)
We prove NCd (c) ∼= NC
′
d (f(c)) only for the case a). One demonstrates
other cases analogously. Assume c satisfies a). f sends c to f(c) ∈ A′ with
2 out-<A′-edges and 2 out-R′-edges. Hence, the immediate surroundings of
c and f(c) are isomorphic. To visualize the structure NAd (c), where A =
(A,A,<A), consider a movement which starts from c and goes along edges
in G(A) at most at distance d. One can mirror this movement in G(A′),
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where A′ = (A′, A′, <A′), starting from f(c). Let s be the distance between
the two points one can reach in this way. Clearly s 6 2d. Another possible
path between these points (either in G(A) or G(A′)) has length 3m − s >
3m− 2d > 3m−m > 4d. Hence, d-neighbourhoods of c and f(c), restricted
to A and A′ respectively, are simply isomorphic parts of bridges with c and
f(c) as their central points, where the endings of the bridges do not connect
or overlap because the distance d is to small to make this happen.
Now, consider how we move from c at distance d using R-edges and <B-
edges as well. c has 2 out-R-edges which send it to different points b, b′ ∈ B
separated by the distance 3m in G(B), where B = (B,B,<B). This is easily
visualized in Figure II.3, where b and b′ lie on the opposite sides of the
hexagon. Now, the movement from c at distance k in a given direction within
A is mirrored by the relation R by the two movements from b and b′ in the
same direction at distance k in B (see Figure II.3). The same remark applies
to the movement from f(c) ∈ A′ except that R′ sends f(c) to the points in
B′ which lie on different triangles and thus the distance between them in
G(B′) is ∞. Hence, it is clear that NC′d (f(c)) is isomorphic to the structure
in Figure II.4. Getting back to C, we see that if we start from c, we explore
B at most at distance d− 1 from b and b′. Let s be the distance between the
two points that one can reach from c in G(C) by going at most at distance d.
Clearly, s 6 2d. There are other paths connecting the two points, but they
are not included in NCd (c), because the length of these paths is greater than
2d. Hence, NCd (c) actually looks like in Figure II.4.
Going through other cases, we eventually show that C d C′. However,
C /∈ Q and C′ ∈ Q, which contradicts the Hanf-locality of Q. 
II.4 Complexity
In this section we study the computational complexity of the generalized
polyadic quantifiers introduced in Section II.1. In Section II.3 we show that
the quantifiers in question are not FO-expressible. However, they are ex-
pressible in the existential fragment of SO. Hence, by Fagin’s theorem [Fagin,
1974], they are in NP . This observation provokes natural questions about
PTIME-computability and NP -completeness. The results are to some ex-
tent surprising. We show that H is in P , whereas other quantifiers are
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NP -complete. For background information on computational complexity,
see e.g. [Arora and Barak, 2009].
Definition 6 Let A = (A,<A) be a finite strict partial order. The height of
A, denoted by h(A), is the number of vertices in the longest chain in A.
Lemma 7 h is in P .
Proof: The argument uses the Sedgewick strategy [Sedgewick and Wayne,
2011] for finding the longest paths in a directed graph with the help of
the Ford-Bellman algorithm. The strategy rests on the observation that the
shortest path (in terms of weights) in an acyclic directed graph with all
weights multiplied by−1 is the same as the longest path in the original graph.
The Ford-Bellman algorithm is designed for acyclic weighted directed graphs.
Strict partial orders are acyclic directed graphs, so the shortest path in a
strict partial order with negative weights always exists. Now, the application
of the Sedgewick strategy to our problem is straightforward. Take a strict
poset X = (X,<X) as input. Construct a weighted strict poset X ′ = (X,<X
, w) by labelling all edges in X with −1 (which means we set w(x, y) = −1
for all x, y ∈ X such that x <X y). For every v ∈ X ′, run the Ford-Bellman
algorithm and find the shortest path from v to all other vertices inX ′. Return
the number of edges of the shortest path in X ′. The construction of X ′ from
X is in P , the Ford-Bellman algorithms works in polynomial time, hence h
is in P . 
Lemma 8 Let A, B be strict posets. There is a homomorphism from A to
B iff h(A) 6 h(B).
Proof: Let A, B be strict posets.
(⇒) Let f be a homomorphism from A to B. Observe that f maps every
path in A into an isomorphic path in B. Hence h(A) 6 h(B).
(⇐) Assume h(A) 6 h(B). Let A′ be the strict poset obtained from A
by adding new vertex a, drawing edges from a to every source vertex in A
(a source vertex is a vertex with no ingoing edges) and taking the transitive
closure of the resulting relation. For i = 1, 2, . . . , h(A) define
Ai = {v ∈ A−{a} : the longest path from a to v in A′ has length i}. (20)
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bh(B)
bh(B)−1
...
Ah(A) f bh(A)
Ah(A)−1 f bh(A)−1
...
...
A2
f b2
A1
f b1
Figure II.5
We show that {Ai}16i6h(A) is a partition of A. Of course,
⋃
16i6h(A)Ai = A,
since all paths from a to any vertex in A − {a} have lengths belonging to
{1, 2, . . . , h(A)}. Obviously, Ai ∩ Aj = ∅, for every i 6= j, 1 6 i, j 6 h(A).
To prove that each Ai is non-empty, let a1a2 . . . ah(A) be a path in A. We
claim ai ∈ Ai, for i = 1, 2, . . . , h(A). For suppose the contrary. Choose j
such that 1 6 j 6 h(A) and aj /∈ Aj . Of course, aj /∈ Ak, for k < j,
since aa1a2 . . . aj has length j > k. So aj ∈ Am, for some m > j. Choose
such a number m and let aa′1a′2 . . . a′m be a path in A′ with a′m = aj . But
then aa′1a′2 . . . a′maj+1 . . . ah(A) is a path of length greater than h(A) which is
impossible. This proves that ai ∈ Ai 6= ∅, for i = 1, 2, . . . , h(A) and concludes
the proof that {Ai}16i6h(A) is a partition of A. Now let i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , h(A)}.
We show that for all u, v ∈ Ai, it is not the case that u <A v. Suppose the
contrary and choose u, v ∈ Ai such that u <A v. Let au1u2 . . . ui = u and
av1v2 . . . vi = v be paths in A′. But then au1u2 . . . uiv is a path in A′ from
a to v and it has length i+ 1, so v ∈ Ai+1, contrary to our assumption.
We show that for every u, v ∈ A, if u <A v, then there are i, j such
that u ∈ Ai, v ∈ Aj and 1 6 i < j 6 h(A). Let u, v ∈ A and u <A v.
Since {Ai}16i6h(A) is a partition, u ∈ Ai and v ∈ Aj , for some unique
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i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , h(A)}. We show i < j. To prove it, assume i > j. But then
we have a path au1u2 . . . ui = u of length i and au1u2 . . . uiv of length i+ 1,
so v ∈ Ai+1. Hence v ∈ Aj ∩ Ai+1, where j 6= i + 1, which contradicts the
fact that {Ai}16i6h(A) is a partition.
We are ready to define a homomorphism from A to B. Let b1, b2, . . . , bh(A)
be a path in B. The desired homomorphism f is defined as follows: f(Ai) =
{bi}, for i = 1, 2, . . . , h(A) (see Figure II.5). Since {Ai}16i6h(A) is a partition
of A, f is a function. We show f is indeed a homomorphism. Let x, y ∈ A.
Assume x <A y. Then there are unique i, j such that x ∈ Ai, y ∈ Aj and
1 6 i < j 6 h(A). By the definition of f , f(x) = bi and f(y) = bj . We have
bi <B bj , so f(x) <B f(y). 
Theorem 9 H is in P .
Proof: Corollary from Lemma 7 and Lemma 8. 
H differs from other quantifiers defined in Section II.1 in two aspects.
H1–1, H1–1F , E , EF , EDF require that the similarity function is injective. HF ,
HDF , H1–1F , EF , EDF have an additional non-fixed relation R ⊆ A×B which
restricts the behavior of the similarity function. The next theorem shows
that these two aspects make a significant difference in the computational
complexity (if P 6= NP ).
Theorem 10 HF , HDF , H1–1, H1–1F , E, EF , EDF are NP -complete.
Proof: Let Q ∈ {H1–1, E} and QR ∈ {HF ,HDF ,H1–1F , EF , EDF }. Q and QR
are definable by existential SO-sentences over the signature σ = (A,B,<A
, <B) and σR = (A,B,<A, <B, R), respectively (see Section II.1). By the
Fagin theorem [Fagin, 1974], Q and QR are in NP .
We prove that Q and QR are NP -hard. We do this by showing that
3SAT is polynomially reducible to Q and QR. We demonstrate polynomial
constructions which, given an arbitrary 3CNF -formula ϕ, output a double
partial order Dϕ and a coupled partial order Cϕ such that:
ϕ ∈ 3SAT ⇔ Dϕ ∈ Q (21a)
ϕ ∈ 3SAT ⇔ Cϕ ∈ QR (21b)
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Let ϕ :=
∧k
i=1(ai ∨ bi ∨ ci) be an arbitrary 3CNF -formula, where k is the
number of clauses, ai, bi, ci are literals, for i = 1, 2, . . . , k. We construct a
double partial order Dϕ = (A ∪ B,A,<A, B,<B). Let A = {vi : 1 6 i 6
k}∪ {vij : 1 6 i < j 6 k} consist of k+ k2−k2 elements. Let <A⊆ A2 be such
that
(∀x, y ∈ A) {x <A y ⇔ ∃ i, j [x = vi ∧ (y = vij ∨ y = vji)]}.
(A,<A) is easily visualised as a k-clique on {vi : 1 6 i 6 k}, where each
edge {vi, vj}, i < j, is replaced by edges vivij , vjvij . Obviously, (A,<A) is a
strict partial order and verifying whether given two elements of A are in <A
is polynomial. To construct (B,<B), let
B =
k⋃
i=1
{vai , vbi , vci}∪⋃
16i<j6k
{vaiaj , vaibj , vaicj , vbiaj , vbibj , vbicj , vciaj , vcibj , vcicj}
consist of 3k + 9k
2−k
2 elements. The idea is that we construct vertices from
all occurrences (tokens) of the literals in the formula ϕ and we add artificial
vertices for all (unordered) pairs of literals such that the elements of the pair
belong to different clauses. The size of B is polynomial with respect to k.
Let <B⊆ B2 be such that for all u,w ∈ B:
u <B w ⇔ ∃x, y ∈ {a, b, c} ∃ i, j ∈ [k]
[u = vxi ∧ (w = vxiyj ∨ w = vyjxi) ∧ ¬(xi ⇔ yj)].
(B,<B) is easily visualized as follows. Let xi and yj be two tokens of literals
from different clauses of ϕ, i < j. Formally, it means that xi ∈ {ai, bi, ci},
yj ∈ {aj , bj , cj}, i < j. If xi and yj are consistent, we add edges vxivxiyj ,
vyjvxiyj . It is easy to see that <B is a strict partial order on the set B and
computing the characteristic function of the relation <B is polynomial with
respect to k. This ends the construction of Dϕ. Cϕ is constructed in the same
way as Dϕ, except that we add the coupling relation R.
R =
k⋃
i=1
(
{vi} × {vai , vbi , vci}
)
∪
⋃
16i<j6k
(
{vij} ×
⋃
x,y∈{a,b,c}
{vxiyj}
)
(22)
47
We prove (21a) and (21b).
(⇒) Assume ϕ ∈ 3SAT . Hence, there is a valuation t of propositional
variables in ϕ and a sequence of literals l1, . . . , lk such that li ∈ {ai, bi, ci},
for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, and ∀ i 6 k t(li) = 1. Hence, the literals l1, l2, . . . , lk are
consistent. Let f : A→ B be as follows:
f(x) =
vli x = vivlilj x = vij , i < j.
Clearly, f is an embedding of (A,<A) into (B,<B) and hence an injective
homomorphism from (A,<A) to (B,<B). Therefore, Dϕ ∈ Q. Observe that
{Ra}a∈A is a disjoint family and ∀ a ∈ A f(a) ∈ Ra. So Cϕ ∈ QR.
(⇐) Observe that Dϕ ∈ H1–1 iff Dϕ ∈ E . Assume f : A → B is an
injective homomorphism from (A,<A) to (B,<B). Then f(A) cannot have
any additional edges apart from those that are mapped by f (we prove
Cϕ ∈ HDF ⇔ Cϕ ∈ EDF in a similar way). Now, observe that the conditions
Cϕ ∈ HF , Cϕ ∈ HDF , Cϕ ∈ H1–1F , Cϕ ∈ EF , Cϕ ∈ EDF are equivalent. The
disjointness of {Ra}a∈A in Cϕ settles the equivalences Cϕ ∈ HDF ⇔ Cϕ ∈
H1–1F , Cϕ ∈ HF ⇔ Cϕ ∈ HDF , Cϕ ∈ EF ⇔ Cϕ ∈ EDF . The equivalence
Cϕ ∈ HDF ⇔ Cϕ ∈ EDF is already established. This ends the argument for
all equivalences for Cϕ. Now, observe that Cϕ ∈ QR implies Dϕ ∈ Q. For the
converse, assume Dϕ ∈ Q. Let f be an appropriate injective homomorphism.
Let vi, vj ∈ A, i < j. Observe that f maps vi, vj to literals from different
clauses (as literals form the same clause cannot point to the same vertex).
Hence, f is easily rearranged to satisfy ∀ a ∈ A f(a) ∈ Ra. By definition,
{Ra}a∈A is a disjoint family. Therefore Cϕ ∈ QR.
We are ready to prove the (⇐) part of (21a) and (21b). Assume Cϕ ∈ QR.
Observe f(vi) ∈ {ai, bi, ci}, for every 1 6 i 6 k and f(vij) ∈
⋃
x,y∈{a,b,c}{vxiyj},
for every 1 6 i < j 6 k. Consider literals f(v1), f(v2), . . . , f(vk). Let
1 6 i < j 6 k. Since f is a homomorphism, we have f(vi) <B vf(vi)f(vj)
and vf(vi)f(vj) <B f(vj). By definition of <B, f(vi) and f(vj) are consistent.
Hence, f(v1), f(v2), . . . , f(vk) are all pairwise consistent. Hence, ϕ is satisfi-
able. 
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II.5 Discussion
Recent developments at the intersection of semantic complexity and cog-
nitive science have vindicated the empirical relevance of various computa-
tional models of human comprehension [Szymanik, 2016]. For example, it
has been demonstrated that various complexity distinctions are reflected in
human processing during cognitive tasks such as verification. In this chapter
we provide a logical and computational analysis of some everyday language
quantifier constructions that are likely to serve as an empirical material for
further research in this direction.
We are particularly interested in the connection between semantic com-
plexity and semantic variation. Specifically, our focus is on the conjecture
that computational complexity pressures may result in a specific kind of
synchronic semantic variation. This hypothesis, anticipated in [Mostowski
and Wojtyniak, 2004], is closely connected to another one which we refer to
as the Shift from Complexity Hypothesis (SCH) according to which human
subjects, when confronted with a hard problem, are likely to switch from the
initially preferred complex interpretation to an easy one [Szymanik, 2010].
To our knowledge, only one work has attempted to test SCH experimen-
tally [Schlotterbeck and Bott, 2013].
One way to test these conjectures consists in confronting results from in-
ference and verification [Mostowski and Wojtyniak, 2004,Gierasimczuk and
Szymanik, 2009]. Inference task amounts to recognizing whether one sen-
tence follows from another one. Verification task consists in recognizing the
truth value of a sentence in a model. If a human subject accepts (rejects) a
sentence in a given model (situation) and accepts its consequence which is
readily false (true) in this model (situation) then clearly the subject employs
different meanings in verification and inference. In compliance to SCH, such
a behaviour may be rooted in pressures coming from computational com-
plexity, for example when a subject realizes that a verification task with an
initially preferred meaning is too difficult, she may change the initial inter-
pretation to an easier one. We present this argument in a greater detail in
Section II.5.
We show that the results from Sections II.3 and II.4 may provide a the-
oretical basis for investigating the effects of semantic complexity on cogni-
tive processing. It has been conjectured that human subjects may switch
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from hard to easy semantics when confronted with an intractable cognitive
task [Szymanik, 2010]. This is what we have called the Shift from Complexity
Hypothesis (SCH). In [Szymanik, 2010] it has also been pointed out that a
similar behaviour is predicted by the so+called PTIME-Cognition Hypoth-
esis [Frixione, 2001,Mostowski and Wojtyniak, 2004,van Rooij, 2008], accord-
ing to which real time human cognitive capacities are limited to PTIME-
computable functions. The SCH has already received some confirmation
[Schlotterbeck and Bott, 2013]. If SCH is actually true, we expect that com-
putational complexity pressures influence the interpretative preferences of
human subjects in verification tasks involving hard examples from Section
II.2. In the case of easy examples, namely instances of the homomorphism
quantifier, there should be no significant effect of complexity.
Some predictions of the SCH allow for drawing conclusions which may
be of interest for evolutionary linguistics. Specifically, we outline how com-
putational complexity pressures may result in a specific kind of synchronic
semantic variation. As an example, consider the original Barwise sentence
(1) whose strong reading is:
∃ f : A→ B ∀x, y ∈ A [R(x, f(x)) ∧ (x <A y ⇒ f(x) <B f(y))] (23)
We omit the disjointness condition as it does not bring nothing new to the
present discussion. Recall that a weak first-order reading is one of the fol-
lowing:
∀x, y ∈ A ∃ z, w ∈ B [x <A y ⇒ (z <B w ∧ R(x, z) ∧ R(y, w))] (24a)
∀x, y ∈ A ∃ z, w ∈ B [R(x, z) ∧ R(y, w) ∧ (x <A y ⇒ z <B w)] (24b)
We are interested in finding out whether a semantic change occurs at
the inter- or intra-individual level during verification. Hence, we need some
empirical cues about the semantics employed by human subjects. This may
be identified through picture completion experiments as in [Schlotterbeck
and Bott, 2013]. Another approach consists in investigating the inferential
meaning [Barwise, 1979,Mostowski, 1994]. Inferential semantics may be iden-
tified with the net of inferential connections between a given sentence and
other sentences. To illustrate this, observe that (23) implies the following
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first-order sentence:
∀x, y, z ∈ A ∃u, v, w ∈ B [R(x, u) ∧ R(y, v)∧
∧ R(z, u) ∧ (x <A y <A z ⇒ u <B v <B w)]
(25)
However, (25) follows neither from (24a) nor (24b) (see discussion on linear
readings in Section II.2. Now, if the subject accepts that a sentence whose
logical form is (25) actually follows from the Barwise example then we may
hypothesise that the subject uses the strong reading during the inference.2
Note, however, that according to Theorem (10), the referential semantics
of the strong reading is intractable. Hence, according to SCH, a subject is
likely to change her interpretation during verification and accept the Barwise
sentence in a model where the strong reading is false. This is precisely the
way how a semantic change may occur at the intraindividual level.
II.6 Summary and Outlook
The Barwise sentence (1) is deemed to expresses the existence of some kind
of homomorphism between partial orders [Barwise, 1979]. We develop new
examples and suggest logical forms which state the existence of other types of
similarities, such as injective homomorphism, embedding and their restricted
versions. We also briefly discuss possible linear interpretations. One of the
key points is that we interpret the semantics of our constructions in terms of
polyadic generalized quantifiers. We call them similarity quantifiers as they
express various similarities between partial orders. We analyse some logical
properties of the similarity quantifiers. Specifically, we show that they are
not FO-expressible over finite models. If unexpectedly P = NP then our
result provides at least some logical classification. However, assuming that
P 6= NP (which is what our contemporary experience suggests), the result
gives no clue whether the similarity quantifiers are practically computable.3
Hence, taking into account SCH which predicts semantic shifts caused by
complexity pressures, there is a need of a more fine-grained complexity clas-
sification. We show that the homomorphism quantifier is in P , whereas the
2Though it may be challenging to come up with a natural example of a sentence whose
logical form is (25).
3If the similarity quantifiers were FO-definable, they would be in P [Immerman, 1999]
and by the Edmonds thesis – practically computable.
51
other quantifiers are NP -complete. It amounts to a good classification of
the quantifiers with respect to practical computability. Based on our com-
plexity results we outline how synchronic semantic variation may occur as a
consequence of computational complexity pressures.
Probably one of the most interesting observations that results from this
and similar research is that there are everyday language constructions which
cannot be given a unique meaning. The present work shows how this may
happen in the context of the Barwise sentence and similar natural language
constructions (see Section II.5). This peculiar semantic variation readily de-
fies description in terms of Thesis 1 discussed in Chapter I. Taking into
account other evidence of synchronic semantic variation, we have decided to
abandon the naive view of semantics and adopt a more refined concept of lan-
guage by positing the existence of cognitive mechanisms that allow language
users to coordinate their individuated semantics through communication. In
the next chapter, we shall see how one may approach this problem.
A natural continuation of the present work is to consider similarity quan-
tifiers in a purely logical setting. There have been a great deal of research
concerning generalized quantifiers and branching quantifiers, in particular.
[Henkin, 1961] mentions the Ehrenfeucht sentence which states that there
are infinitely many objects (which is a property inexpressible in elementary
logic). Moreover, it has been demonstrated that first order logic with Henkin
quantifiers is actually equivalent to the existential fragment of second-order
logic [Enderton, 1970,Walkoe, 1970]. Further mathematical results are ob-
tained in [Krynicki and Mostowski, 1992,Gottlob, 1997,Kołodziejczyk, 2002,
Sevenster, 2006]. Therefore, the general question is what are the properties
of logics with similarity quantifiers.
There is also another interesting point that connects semantic complex-
ity with evolutionary linguistics. Obviously, with a little invention, one may
formulate natural language sentences that have semantics of arbitrary com-
plexity [Kontinen and Szymanik, 2008]. However, there is a part of the nat-
ural language, namely the everyday language, which we use in communica-
tion with ordinary people in everyday life. It has been argued on theoretical
grounds that the class NP provides a strict semantic bound for everyday lan-
guage [Mostowski and Szymanik, 2012] (see [Ristad, 1993] for a related hy-
pothesis). By Fagin’s theorem [Fagin, 1974], NP coincides with Σ11-definable
classes of finite models. The bound is strict as there are examples of ev-
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eryday language sentences with NP -complete semantics (for example the
Barwise sentence). So far we do not know any everyday language construc-
tions that could serve as a counterexample to this Σ11-thesis. Getting back
to language evolution, it would be desirable to find out why the semantics
of everyday language that emerges through communication does not exceed
the Σ11-notions.
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III
Coordination of Proportional Quantifiers
III.1 Introduction
Therefore, on the most general level, the question we ask is how language
users are able to create semantic conventions based on local linguistic inter-
actions with other individuals.
In Chapter I we have provided some grounds for abandoning the uniform
view of semantics and thus its explanatory role in the account of the commu-
nicative functioning of language in situations involving synchronic semantic
variation. We have raised some doubts about the applicability of the learn-
ing by recognizing approach to semantically non-uniform populations. More-
over, we have observed that learning by recognizing seems to be restrained to
learning phenomena which are restrained by the traditional teacher-learner
distinction. If we accept that the semantics of a language community may
be less uniform then we are faced with the problem of explaining how indi-
viduals are able to use their language as an effective tool for communication.
Our main motivation in this chapter is to provide a plausible solution to this
problem in the form of a mathematically precise and generic model.
Contemporarily, this type of research is conceived as a part of evolution-
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ary linguistics and follows various methodological paradigms [Steels, 2011].
Linguistic approach searches for cognitive operations accounting for language
change as evidenced by empirical data. Psychological approach consists on
performing experiments with human subjects so as to find out what kind of
language formation strategies are used in nature. Modelling approach for-
mulates theoretical models for computer simulation, robotic experiments or
mathematical analysis. The present work contributes to the modelling ap-
proach.
At the present stage of the field, we have several frameworks which differ
in many respects (see Chapter I for a short overview). Each of these frame-
works seems to bring new insights into language evolution and change. The
relation between various modelling approaches is not obvious as they are
often based on different assumptions or overlapping sets variables and pa-
rameters. It seems that this is one of the difficulties anticipated in [Chomsky,
1986]. For example, one of the obvious examples include the relation between
collaborative and individualistic models. In the former language evolution
and change is modelled as a dynamical system of intertwined interactions
between a number of individuals in population. In the later language evolu-
tion is modelled as a chain of several generations of a teacher-learner scenario
where a learner from a given generation becomes a teacher in the next gen-
eration [Kirby et al., 2014]. It is not immediately obvious what we miss or
gain when considering one of these models instead of another one. Only just
recently some authors have attempted to answer such questions [Fay et al.,
2010,Spike et al., 2016].
Our approach is essentially collaborative. The model includes a popu-
lation of individuals which we refer to as agents. Each agent is equipped
with various hypotheses about the meaning of language expressions. Agents
are communicating with each other in shared contexts. They want to adapt
their semantic interpretations to minimize communication failures. Hence,
the goal of the learning process is to converge on meaning that allows com-
munication, i.e., to learn by coordination. For the coordination of semantics
to take place, agents need some distributed mechanisms that allow them to
introduce uniformity in semantics by performing local linguistic interactions.
This mechanism does not only allow the agents to learn to communicate, but
also forces the language change over time so that at some point a global se-
mantic standard may emerge. In this work we provide a generic mechanics of
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semantic coordination and show how this mechanics work in the case where
the semantics being coordinated is interpretable as a proportional quanti-
fier. The emergence of quantifier semantics has already been tackled too
some extent by other authors. The most recent work [Pauw and Hilferty,
2012] is concerned with the emergence absolute and scalable quantifiers in a
population of grounded agents.
The plan of the present chapter is as follows. In Section III.5 we recall
the concept of a language game and describe our approach to linguistic inter-
action. In Section III.6 we elaborate on the representation of our model and
some simplifying assumptions that we apply. Section III.7 outlines the gen-
eral principles of our solution to the proportional description game. Section
III.8 is devoted to the analysis of simple instances of our model is in terms
of Markov chains. In Section III.9 we draw some conclusions and mention
possible extension of our model to account for distance factor.
III.2 Proportional Quantifiers
Let σ = (R) be a vocabulary, where R is 1-place predicate. According
to Definition 2 from Chapter II, a generalized quantifier of type (1) is an
isomorphism-closed class of σ-structures. Recall that we restrict our atten-
tion only to finite models.
Definition 11 A generalized quantifier Q of type (1) is upward monotone
proportional if there is a rational number h ∈ [0, 1] such that for every σ-
structure M = (U,R):
M ∈ Q ⇔ |R|/|U | > h. (26)
In what follows, we write proportional instead upward monotone propor-
tional.
The prominent example of everyday language quantifier interpretable in
this way is the English most and the Polish większość. One of the conven-
tionalized meanings of these determiners corresponds to the proportional
quantifier determined by h = 1/2. For more details on applications of a gen-
eralized quantifier theory in natural language see [Peters and Westerståhl,
2006].
From the logical point of view, proportional quantifiers are non-trivial
as they are not definable in elementary logic (except ∃ and ∀ which may
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be interpreted as proportional). However, they are definable in the existen-
tial fragment of second order logic and have PTIME-computable model
checking. These properties of proportional quantifiers, along with their nat-
uralness, make them an interesting example of everyday language concepts.
Our choice of proportional quantifiers is partially motivated by mathe-
matical and computational simplicity. As we shall see in Section III.8, our
model is simple enough to provide a comprehensive analysis of two interact-
ing agents (dyads) in terms of Markov chains. However, as it will become
evident from Section III.7, the mechanics of coordination is generic and ap-
plicable to virtually any linguistic construction.
III.3 Cognitive Structure of Agents
For the quantifier to emerge, there must be some language in place. We as-
sume agents use a vocabulary consisting of some unary predicate symbols.
For simplicity, we assume the vocabulary is shared and thus cannot be a
source of misunderstanding. Mathematically speaking, given a finite model,
two agents and a predicate symbol, the interpretation of the symbol in the
model is the same according to both agents. We assume that language con-
tains a symbol Q and the following construction: given a predicate symbol
R, QxRx is a sentence. This syntactic construction is shared. However, the
semantics of the construction Q is not shared and is precisely the object of
coordination. Technically speaking, agents treat Q as an upward monotone
proportional generalized quantifier.
The question is how to include a concept of a generalized quantifier in the
cognitive equipment of agents. Certainly, manipulation with infinite classes
of structures is unrealistic. We adopt a refined view on semantics according to
which the meaning of an expression may be identified with an algorithm for
computing it’s truth-conditions or – more generally – denotation (see Section
I.3 from Chapter I for appropriate references). To see how this view applies in
our case, let Q be a proportional quantifier. We say an algorithm computes Q
if for every finite σ-structure M = (U,R), the computation of the algorithm
on input M outputs the correct answer to the query M ∈ Q. Algorithms are
finite objects and thus may be easily included in the cognitive equipment
of agents. We posit that agents share a meaning generation mechanism that
allows them to use various algorithms for computing proportional quantifiers.
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In what follows, we use H to denote the set of meanings that agents may
generate. We often refer to meanings or algorithms from H as semantic
hypotheses or simply hypotheses.
A typical cognitive structure for representing semantics is an associative
map between expressions and meanings (see, e.g., [Steels and Belpaeme,
2005]). Each connected pair is assigned a weight designating the strength of
the coupling. One may approach this problem in a more simplistic way. In
our case, at any given stage t, each agent associates with Q only one preferred
meaning which he effectively uses while communicating with others. At the
population level, any such association may be described by a function st :
A→ H. We refer to st as synchronic description at stage t. In simple words,
st(a) is the meaning that agent a associates with Q at stage t. We assume
each agent is acquainted only with his own semantics, not the semantics
of others. Observe that within this framework, it is perfectly possible that
different agents ascribe different preferred meanings to the same expression.
This is how the synchronic interindividual variation may be represented at
the cognitive level.
We assume learners prefer simpler hypotheses, according to some com-
putationally justifiable notion of simplicity. We model this by introducing an
ordering of hypotheses. For x, y ∈ H, x  y means that x is simpler than or
as simple as y. It seems that the notion of quasi-ordering suits well in this
context as it ascertains that simplicity is transitive and reflexive. To give
an example, consider natural language quantifiers such as more than k, for
k ∈ N . They are interpretable as type (1) generalized quantifiers and are
recognizable by finite automata [van Benthem, 1986]. Suppose H consists of
finite automata recognizing such quantifiers. Then we may define a quasi-
order of simplicity as follows: for A,B ∈ H, A  B iff A has at most as
many states as B.1 Observe that, in this case,  is also well-founded. In the
present work we take H to be finite so well-foundedness is not our worry.
III.4 Society of Agents
In what follows, a population is a finite set, on the most occasions denoted
by A. To reflect the relative social standing of agents we introduce authority
1Curiously, such a simplicity classification is reflected in human comprehension [Szy-
manik and Zajenkowski, 2010].
58
functions. Specifically, we assume each agent a ∈ A is equipped with a func-
tion wa : A → R+. Given two agents, a, b ∈ A, the intuitive sense of wa(b)
is that a perceives b as having the authority equal to wa(b), whereas wa(a)
reflects how much weight agent a assigns to his own opinion. This frame-
work gives us a way to analyse various configurations of authority and its
influence on coordination. In the present account we shall restrict ourselves
to the authority functions which satisfy the following: for every a, b, c ∈ A,
wa(c) = wb(c). This condition roughly corresponds to a situation where
members of the population react similarly to other agents. Thus, we shall
always assume there is one authority function w : A → R+ which ascribes
to each agent his authority within a population. The role of social impact
in the adoption of conventions has already been explored to some extent in
the literature (see, e.g., [Kosterman and Gierasimczuk, 2015, Blythe et al.,
2016]).
The multi-agent model of semantic coordination has to specify interac-
tion topology, i.e. structure of relations between agents. There are several
ways of structuring a society of agents. The paradigm of social networks al-
lows thinking of a communication through pre-established channels between
agents [DeGroot, 1974]. Another approach just assumes a probability of an
encounter among any two agents. In the present chapter we consider dyads
interacting in the round-robin fashion.
III.5 Proportional Description Game
In the philosophical literature, the notion of a language game has been in-
troduced and discussed in [Wittgenstein, 1953]. Intuitively, a language game
is a routinised symbolic interaction between agents embedded in a common
context and having some communicative goal. Language games take different
forms. We will be chiefly concerned with model-checking games – a group
of agents verifies an expression against a given scenario, some of them judge
the expression to be true, others to be false. They announce their individ-
ual judgements. Another relevant communication structure is the so-called
signalling games, where upon an encounter one agent assumes the role of a
speaker, the other of a receiver [Skyrms, 2010]. The goal of the speaker is
to choose a signal (an expression), which will allow the receiver to correctly
interpret what is that the sender has in mind. In a similar way, one can
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imagine studying other communication games such as games of reference,
action games or description games [Steels, 2012].
Model-checking game involves a number of players that interact according
to a realized communication pattern which may be represented in the form
of a sequence of several interactions. A single interaction is a quadruple
(a, b,M, v), where a ∈ A is a speaker, b ∈ A is a hearer, M is a context
(which we refer to as the topic) and v is a truth value. An intended meaning
of the realisation of (a, b,M, v) at stage t is that a communicates to b the
output of st(a) on inputM. Note that this is the only knowledge agents have
about the semantics of others. We often denote games by uppercase greek
letters Ω,Θ.
In this chapter, we focus on games with topics of the form M = (U,R)
where U is a finite universe and R is a unary relation. Moreover, according
to our previous assumptions, given an interaction (a, b,M, v) at stage t, the
hypothesis st(a) is an algorithm computing some proportional quantifier. We
refer to this type of game as the proportional description game. Intuitively,
a proportional description game is driven by the need to agree upon the
meaning of a quantifier construction which essentially expresses that there
are more objects satisfying a given property than some proportion. Players
engaging in such games, if equipped with appropriate alignment strategies,
may eventually develop semantics that satisfy the motivational need.
III.6 Simplifying Assumptions
In this section we simplify many aspects of the proportional description
game. We assume agents use practical algorithms in the sense of the Edmonds
thesis [Edmonds, 1987] according to which practical computability overlaps
with PTIME, i.e. the class of functions computable by deterministic Turing
machines in polynomial time [Arora and Barak, 2009]. We do not differentiate
between practical algorithms for computing the same proportional quanti-
fier. Hence, we represent algorithms for Q by completely reduced fractions
r ∈ [0, 1] which – in a number theoretic literature [Hardy and Wright, 1979]
– are referred to as Farey fractions. Furthermore, we put some limitations
on algorithms that agents may actually choose. We exclude the possibility of
computations involving very large denominators. Hence, we restrict admis-
sible fractions to denominators not greater than some given positive integer.
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In this context, the notion of a Farey sequence is very handy [Hardy and
Wright, 1979].
Definition 12 Let k > 0 be an integer. A Farey sequence of order k is the
set consisting of completely reduced fractions from [0, 1] whose denominators
do not exceed k. The Farey sequence of order k is denoted by Fk.
Having this notation, a space of possible meanings that agents may actually
choose is limited to Fk, for some k ∈ N . Thus, at any give stage t, the
synchronic description is given by a function st : A→ Fk.
Observe that for any given σ-structure M = (U,R), only the proportion
|R|/|U | is essential for computing M |= QxR(x) (see Equation 26 in Defini-
tion 11). Hence, we representM by a Farey fraction equal to |R|/|U |. We can
do that without loss of generality because any two models M = (U,R) and
M′ = (U ′, R′) such that |R|/|U | = |R′|/|U ′| make exactly the same sentences
QxR(x) true. Now, the representation of a single interaction (a, b,M, v) re-
duces to (a, b, r, v), where r = |R|/|U |.
On many occasions, situational contexts we encounter in our everyday
conversations are unpredictable. This is why we decide to model the environ-
ment by a random variable X. Given the fractional representation of finite
σ-structures, we define X so that it assumes values in Farey fractions from
[0, 1]. Discrete random variables are sufficient for our analysis (generally, one
may consider continuous random variables supported on [0, 1]). Intuitively,
X is a random variable on finite models of the form (U,R) and for any such
model, the value of X is |R|/|U |.
Playing a language game consists in gathering at least two parties. In
general, realization of particular interactions is largely shaped by the under-
lying social network and the spatial relations between agents. In the present
work, we focus on the most fundamental and simple interactions performed
within dyads, i.e. groups of two agents. Dyads are assumed to be static in the
sense that agents are not replaced during learning. Furthermore, we assume
that all interactions are symmetrical, i.e., if (a, b, r, v) is an interaction in the
game then so is (b, a, r, v′).
III.7 Solution
In this section we present a generic solution to the problem of adopting the
semantic convention of a given expression through playing model-checking
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h′h
v
v′
Figure III.1: Symmetrical dyadic communication on the topic r. Hypotheses
of a and b are h and h′, respectively. Agent a announces v (the truth value
of r > h) whereas agent b announces v′ (the truth value of r > h′).
games. The crucial part of the solution is the agent-based mechanism of
coordination (see Algorithm 1).
The general picture of learning by coordination is as follows. The evo-
lution of semantics is represented by a sequence of synchronic descriptions
s0, s1, s2, s3, . . . . At each stage t, agents play a model-checking game. During
the game each agent gets acquainted with the announcements of the agents
that speak to him. Moreover, the hearers of a given agent get acquainted
with his judgements. Recall, that the announcements of truth values are
based on the semantics given by the synchronic description st. Figure III.1
presents the simplest symmetrical dyadic communication game. At the end
of stage t all agents simultaneously apply the coordination algorithm. Each
agent, on the basis of the answers of his interlocutors and his own semantics,
replaces his current hypothesis with a new one. Thus, the application of the
coordination algorithm by all agents determines the synchronic description
at stage t+ 1.
Note that the coordination is entirely agent-based. There is no central
control over the whole process whatsoever. Agents are also autonomous and
(partially) independent. Autonomy means that they use their own cognitive
resources. Independence ascertains that the coordination cannot be directly
influenced by others. However, as we shall see, agents exert indirect influ-
ence due to their social authority. Perhaps the most important feature of this
mechanism is that it is not transparent: neither the agent performing coordi-
nation nor the other agents have insight into the workings of the mechanism
and its direct effects. The only observable effect of coordination manifests in
the announcements of truth values.
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We posit that the goal of the agents is to communicate successfully, using
the quantifier construction Q. Intuitively, successful communication means
that whenever agents are faced with a common context, they recognize the
same sentences as true. To include this goal in the behaviour of agents, we
assume successful communication is beneficial for interacting parties. We can
measure the success rate of various hypotheses with respect to the amount of
agreement they generate in a given situation and assume that compatibility
earns most reward. This is explicitly represented by the reward function. In-
tuitively, given an agent and a communication game, the value of the reward
function for a hypothesis h is to measure how much successful she would be
if she adopted h in the present game.
Given an agent a, his current hypothesis h0, his authority w0 and a com-
munication game, a runs the coordination algorithm on input consisting of
exactly those interactions of the game where she is the hearer. We repre-
sent the input by providing separate lists of topics r1, r2, . . . , rm and truth
values v1, v2, . . . , vm. Instead of giving the list of the speakers we provide
corresponding authorities w1, w2, . . . , wm. Now, given an arbitrary hypothe-
sis h, let z = z1, z2, . . . , zm be a binary sequence defined as follows: zj = 1
iff (rj > h⇔ vj = 1). The value of the reward function is then defined as
reward(h) =
{
Σmi=1zi · wi if h 6= h0
w0 + Σ
m
i=1zi · wi otherwise
(27)
Observe that if all agents have authority 1, the reward of h is simply the
amount of successful interactions that a would participate as a hearer if she
used h. Additionally, if h is equal to the current hypothesis of a, the reward
is increased by the value w0 to reflect the fact that a is to some extent
independent from external social influences.
To mimic our natural preference for simple solutions we introduce a par-
tial ordering on hypotheses.
Definition 13 We say a Farey fraction h is simpler than or as simple as h′
(h 4 h′) if the denominator of h is lesser than or equal to the denominator of
h′. Given a set X ⊆ F , the set of all 4-minimal elements of X is designated
by S(X).
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Algorithm 1 Coordination
Agent: current hypothesis h0, authority w0
Input: topics r1, r2, . . . , rm
authorities w1, w2, . . . , wm
answers v1, v2, . . . , vm
Output: hypothesis from H
1: for all h ∈ H do
2: for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,m do
3: zi := the truth value of (ri > h⇔ vi = 1)
4: end for
5: reward(h) :=
{
Σmi=1zi · wi if h 6= h0
w0 + Σ
m
i=1zi · wi otherwise
. see Equation 27
6: end for
7: M := {h ∈ H : ∀h′ reward(h) > reward(h′)}
8: return random element from S(M)
The agent computes the reward for every hypothesis h from the space of
hypotheses H (lines 1–6). This amounts to computing, for each h, which
interactions would be successful, if he used h in the present situation (lines
2–4) and assigning a reward to h, according to Equation 27 (line 5). Next,
the agent considers only those hypotheses that have the highest value of
the reward function (line 7). Intuitively, such hypotheses guarantee maximal
compatibility with interlocutors in current situation. The agent rejects too
complicated hypotheses (line 8) and, finally, changes his current semantics
to a random hypothesis from what is left (line 8). We assume the probability
of drawing an element from S(M) such that |S(M)| = m equals 1/m.
III.8 Semantic Evolution as a Markov Chain
At this point, it is not obvious how the semantics evolves according to our
model and how it is affected by various parameters such as authorities or the
structure of communication games. We approach this problem by providing
a Markov chain representation of the evolution of semantics for dyadic sym-
metric interactions. We define and analyse three models which we denote by:
M1, M2 and M3. In M1 equal-authority dyads communicate symmetrically
on a single topic per game (however, different games may have different top-
ics). M2 is the same as M1, except that dyads have differentiated authority.
M2 extends M2 by allowing agents to communicate in scenarios involving
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multiple topics.
Let A be a set of agents, w an authority function, H a space of hypothe-
ses. The system evolves stage by stage. Suppose the semantics at stage t is
given by the synchronic description st : A→ H and agents play a communi-
cation game. Each agent takes the data from the present game as input and
updates his semantics according to the Algorithm 1. This results in a new
synchronic description st+1 : A→ H. Observe that st+1 depends only on st
and the present game. In other words, the evolution of semantics implied by
our solution is a memoryless process – the past is irrelevant for the current
behaviour of the system. Discrete-time Markov chains are well suited for
description of this kind of processes [Feller, 1968].
One way of defining a Markov chain is to specify a set S of all possible
states of the system and a stochastic matrix [pss′ ]s,s′∈S of transition proba-
bilities. (To obtain a complete description we need initial probabilities pi, for
every i ∈ S. However, pi’s are not important for our purposes.) A stochastic
matrix is a square matrix of non-negative reals such that each row sums up
to 1. The transition probability pss′ is to measure the likelihood that the
state of the system changes from s to s′ in one stage. We give an example of
such system in Figure III.2 which illustrates a three-state Markov chain of
a very simple model describing the probabilities of weather conditions given
the weather at the preceding day.
To apply these considerations to the evolution of semantics, let A be a
set of agents, H a space of hypotheses, w an authority function. We posit
that the set of states S is the set of all synchronic descriptions, namely all
functions from A to H or, equivalently, all |A|-tuples assuming values in H.
Given s, s′ ∈ S, the value pss′ designates the probability that the synchronic
description changes from s to s′ in one step of coordination according to the
Algorithm 1.
To calculate the transitions we need a probabilistic description of com-
munication games. For simplicity, each model we consider assumes a fixed
number of interactions per game (this number is always even as the the
communication is symmetrical). An important part is the probability that a
given fraction becomes a topic of an interaction. This is given by the random
variable X with an associated probability function P (see Section III.6). This
information suffices to calculate the transition probabilities for each of the
subsequent models.
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Figure III.2: Simple Markov chain. Labelled arrows designate transition prob-
abilities, e.g, the transition from rainy to cloudy has probability 0.3.
III.8.1 Equality
In this section we investigate evolution of semantics for symmetrically com-
municating dyads consisting of agents of equal authority. At each stage a
communication game involves one topic.
Let A = {1, 2} and H = Fk, for some k > 0. The authorities of agents are
equal, so w is a constant authority function. The topic encountered in the
environment is understood as a random variate of a random variable X with
an associated probability function P . At each stage we generate a random
variate r and produce an instance of the proportional description game. The
instance of the game consists of two interactions: (1, 2, r, v) and (2, 1, r, v′)
(see Figure III.1). We denote such a model by M1.
Before we state the representation theorem, let us fix some notation. We
write s(1)s(2) to designate the state s ∈ S. For example, the state s such
that s(1) = 0 and s(2) = 12 is designated by 0
1
2 . The transition probability
from s to s′, normally denoted by pss′ , is written as ps(1)s(2)→s′(1)s′(2). For
example, the transition probability from the state s such that s(1) = 0 and
s(2) = 12 to the state s
′ such that s′(1) = 1 and s′(1) = 1 is designated
by p0 1
2
→11. Let xx
′, yy′, zz′ be states. If pxx′→yy′ = pxx′→zz′ = p, we write
pxx′→yy′|zz′ = p to denote the conjunction of pxx′→yy′ = p and pxx′→zz′ = p.
Theorem 14 Fix an instance of M1, where A = {1, 2}, H = Fk, for k > 1,
X is a random variable with a probability function P and w is a constant
authority function. Then the model is represented by the Markov chain on
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S = H2 induced by the following probabilities:
p01→01 = P (X = 0) +
P (X > 0)
4
(28a)
p01→00|11|10 =
P (X > 0)
4
(28b)
For all u ∈ H :
puu→uu = 1 (28c)
For all u ∈ H such that 0 < u < 1 :
p0u→0u = P (X = 0) + P (X > u), (28d)
p0u→00|10 =
1
2
P (0 < X 6 u) (28e)
pu1→u1 = P (X 6 u), (28f)
pu1→10|11 =
1
2
P (X > u) (28g)
For all u, v ∈ H such that 0 < u < v < 1 :
puv→uv = P (X 6 u) + P (X > v) (28h)
puv→10 = P (u < X 6 v) (28i)
Proof: Let u, v ∈ H. Without loss of generality, assume u 6 v. We shall
determine possible ways of changing the state from uv to other states, in-
cluding uv. We consider the following cases: a) u = v, b) u = 0, v = 1,
c) u = 0, 0 < v < 1, d) 0 < u < 1, v = 1, e) 0 < u < v < 1. We show how to
calculate transition probabilities for b). The core of the reasoning is similar
in other cases.
Let u = 0, v = 1. We consider all possible arrangements of the topic r
that may affect the truth values exchanged in the game. These arrangements
are: i) r = 0, ii) 0 < r 6 1. Let us designate by Mxya,r∈R the set of hypotheses
for which the value of the reward function is maximal, where the reward is
computed relative to agent a ∈ {1, 2}, the state s ∈ S such that s(1) = x,
s(2) = y and the topic r ∈ R ⊆ [0, 1]. We need to carefully work through
Algorithm 1.
Let us computeM011,r∈(0,1]. The situation is visualised in Figure III.3. The
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s(1) = 0 r s(2) = 1
w0
Figure III.3: Computing M011,r∈(0,1].
horizontal line is [0, 1]. We have a topic r ∈ (0, 1]. The semantics of agent 1
is 0 and that of agent 2 is 1. The numbers at the top indicate the values of
the reward function relative to agent 1 for arguments h ∈ H ⊂ [0, 1]. Below
we show that in this situation the reward equals (i) w for h = 0, (ii) 0 for
0 < h < r, (iii) w for h > r.
Case (i) Suppose agent 1 used h = 0. He would not agree with agent 2,
since his answer is negative (as it is not the case that r > 1), whereas the
answer of agent 1 would be positive (as r > h = 0). According to Algorithm
1, the reward relative to an agent for a given hypothesis is not increased by
the interlocutor’s authority when they disagree. However, h = 0 is the current
hypothesis of agent 1, so the reward for h is promoted by the authority of
agent 1, namely w, as indicated in Figure III.3.
Case (ii) Suppose agent 1 used h such that 0 < h < r. Agent 1 would not
agree with agent 2 for the same reason as in the case (i). Hence, the reward
for h is not incremented by the authority of his interlocutor. The value of h
is not promoted by the authority of a neither, since h 6= s(1) = 0. Therefore,
the reward for h is 0.
Case (iii) Suppose a used h > r. Agent 1 would agree with agent 2, since
the answer of agent 1 would be negative (as it is not the case that r > h).
So the reward for h is increased by the authority of agent 2, namely w. Since
h 6= s(1), the reward for h is not further promoted by the authority of agent
1. Hence, the reward for h is w.
We have just proved thatM011,r∈(0,1] = {0}∪{h ∈ H : h > r}. In a similar
way we prove that M011,r=0 = {0}, M012,r=0 = {1} and M012,r∈(0,1] = {h ∈ H :
h < r} ∪ {1}.
Observe that under the condition that a random variate is r = 0, agent
1 chooses 0 from M011,r=0 with probability 1 and agent 2 chooses 1 from
M012,r=0 with probability 1. Under the condition that a random variate is
0 < r 6 1, agent 1 chooses 0 from M011,r=0 = {0} with probability 1/2
and agent 2 chooses 1 from M012,r∈(0,1] with probability 1/2. Observe that the
68
00 1
½0
0.28
0.44
01
0.28
0.25
0.25
10
0.25
11
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
1
0½
0.28
0.28
0.44
½½ 11½
0.22
0.22
0.56
½1
0.22
0.22
0.56
Figure III.4: Markov chain for M1, where A = {1, 2}, w1 = w2 > 0, H =
{0, 12 , 1} and X ∼ B(50, 0.5).
eventsX = 0 and 0 < X 6 1 form a finite partition of a sample space. Hence,
by the law of total probability, p01→01 = P (X = 0) + P (0 < X 6 1)/4. 
By Theorem 14, agents never change to more complicated semantics (see
Definition 13). They either retain their hypotheses or change to simpler ones.
What is more, the actual change to a simpler hypothesis leads always to 0
or 1. 0 may be interpreted as the existential quantifier. 1 is a trivial (always
false) quantifier—it can be read as more than everything. Hence, M1 cannot
explain how the semantics may evolve from simple to more complex forms.
By Theorem 14, coordination processes of M1 cannot stabilize on semantics
other than 0 or 1, unless initial semantics is a constant function s : A →
{u}, for some hypothesis u such that 0 < u < 1. In linguistic terms, only
the existential quantifier or the trivial quantifier more than everything may
emerge through such coordination processes. Hence, M1 cannot explain how
more complex semantics could emerge. In particular, most is not achievable
in such a model, unless most was common to every agent from the start. The
above observations are not favourable for M1. We get back to these issues in
69
Section III.8.3.
In M1 the evolution of semantics may proceed in subsequent rounds in
the following way: 01, 10, 01, 10, . . .. This phenomenon is partially caused by
equality and is easily observable in many everyday situations which require
some kind of coordination. For example, two people approaching each other
from the opposite directions must somehow coordinate their actions to avoid
collision. They have two possibilities: to go right or left. If the choose different
actions, namely either right-left or left-right, the will collide. However, very
often people switch between two incorrect solutions: after choosing different
actions they observe that this no good, so they both change their mind and
again choose different actions, and so on.
III.8.2 Differentiated Authority
M2 differs from M1 in having non-constant authority function. Without loss
of generality we assume that w1 > w2. Our intention is to investigate how
the coordination processes of such models depend on authority.
Theorem 15 Fix an instance of M2, where A = {1, 2}, H = Fk, for k > 1,
X is a random variable with a probability function P and w is an authority
function such that w1 > w2. Then the model is represented by the Markov
chain on S = H2 induced by the following probabilities:
p01→01 = P (X = 0) (29a)
p01→00 = P (X > 0) (29b)
p10→11 = P (X > 0) (29c)
For all u ∈ H:
puu→uu = 1 (29d)
For all u, v ∈ H such that 0 < u < v < 1:
puv→uv = P (X 6 u) + P (X > v) (29e)
puv→u0 = P (u < X 6 v) (29f)
pvu→v1 = P (u < X 6 v) (29g)
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For all u ∈ H such that 0 < u < 1:
p0u→0u = P (X = 0) + P (X > u) (29h)
p0u→00 = P (0 < X 6 u) (29i)
pu0→u1 = P (0 < X 6 u) (29j)
pu1→u1 = P (X 6 u) (29k)
pu1→u0 = P (X > u) (29l)
p1u→11 = P (X > u) (29m)
Introducing differentiated authority significantly simplifies the whole pro-
cess when compared toM1. For example, inM2 we cannot change from 01 to
10 (and hence from 10 to 01). Therefore, inM2 the coordination cannot pro-
ceed in subsequent rounds in the following way: 01, 10, 01, 10, . . .. However,
by Theorem 14, such phenomenon may occur in M1.
Consider a population in the state 01. It is four times more probable inM2
that the population will stabilize on the existential quantifier. Assuming the
probability P of drawing values closer to 1/2 is greater than the probability
of drawing values further from 1/2 (i.e. closer to either 0 or 1), the chances
of changing from 01 to 00 are very high and increase while P (X = 0) and
P (X = 1) are getting smaller. In the extreme case, P (X = 0) is close to 0.
Hence, by equations (29a) and (29b), a population starting from 01 changes
to 00 with the probability close to 1.
In M2, if an agent with the greatest authority starts with 0, then the
semantics cannot stabilize on anything else than 00. Similarly, if an agent
with the greatest authority starts with 1, then the semantics cannot stabilize
on anything else than 11. InM1, it does not matter whether initial hypothesis
of an agent is 0 or 1 – he can always change to 0 or 1.
Observe that if an agent with the greatest authority starts with a hy-
pothesis other than 0 and 1, then the semantics diverge forever. This effect is
partially due to the simplicity criterion that tells agents to choose maximally
simple hypotheses. However, another reason for this is a very low complexity
of communication games. As we shall see in the next section, increasing the
complexity of communication may drive less authoritative agents to adopt
more complex semantics.
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Figure III.5: Markov chain for M1, where A = {1, 2}, w1 > w2 > 0, H =
{0, 12 , 1} and X ∼ B(50, 0.5). One topic per game.
III.8.3 Multiple Topics
A population that coordinates according to M1 or M2 cannot stabilize on
semantics other than 0 or 1, unless the initial semantics is a constant function
s : A→ {u}, for u such that 0 < u < 1. In linguistic terms, such populations
cannot arrive at semantic conventions different form the existential quantifier
or the trivial quantifier more than everything. Proofs of Theorem 14 and
Theorem 15 explain why this is the case. If agents differ in semantics and
disagree on a given topic, then their maximum-reward hypotheses include
either 0 or 1. The criterion of simplicity forces agents to choose the simplest
hypotheses possible – hence they choose either 0 or 1.
One way of guaranteeing the emergence of more complex semantics is
to relax the criterion of simplicity. We may posit that for all h, h′ ∈ H, the
probability of choosing h is positive and if h is simpler than h′ then the
probability of choosing h is greater than the probability of choosing h′. Such
a relaxed criterion of simplicity may be adequate in certain contexts. We
take a different direction and show that complex semantics may result from
more complex communication games. We assume each communication game
may contain many different topics. In some situations complex games force
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agents to change their current hypotheses to other than 0 or 1. Consequently,
even if agents use the strong simplicity criterion, such coordination processes
may stabilize on semantics other than 0 and 1. To keep things simple, we
consider games consisting of two topics. At each stage of the coordination
process we generate two random variates r, r′ and produce an instance of
the proportional description game. The instance of the game consists of four
interactions: (1, 2, r1, v1), (2, 1, r1, v′1), (1, 2, r2, v2), (2, 1, r2, v′2). Actually we
have two symmetrical interactions (see Figure III.1), one with topic r1 and
another with topic r2. We denote such a model by M3.
We restrict our attention to H = F2. The resulting Markov chain is
simple enough to perform manual calculations and rich enough to observe
some interesting features, such as complex semantics formation. In this case,
complex semantics is 1/2, corresponding to the most quantifier.
We have seven types of authority functions that lead to different Markov
chains representing instances of M3: a) w1 > w2 + w2, b) w1 = w2 + w2,
c) w1 < w2 + w2, w1 > w2, d) w1 = w2, e) w2 > w1 + w1, f) w2 = w1 + w1,
g) w2 < w1 + w1, w2 > w1. We present the Markov chain for a).
00 1 ½½ 1
0½
0.8
0.2 ½0
0.49
0.2
½1
0.31
01
~1
~0
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~1
~0 1½
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Figure III.6: Markov chain for M3, where A = {1, 2}, w1 > w2 + w2, H =
{0, 12 , 1} and X B(50, 0.5). Two topics per game.
Theorem 16 Fix an instance of the M2, where A = {1, 2}, H = F2, X is a
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random variable with a probability function P and w is an authority function
satisfying a). Then the model is represented by the Markov chain on S = H2
induced by the following probabilities:
puu→uu = 1, for all u ∈ H (30a)
p01→01 = P (X = 0)2 (30b)
p01→00 = 1− P (X = 0)2 (30c)
p10→10 = P (X = 0)2 (30d)
p10→11 = 1− P (X = 0)2 (30e)
p0 1
2
→0 1
2
= [P (X = 0) + P (X >
1
2
)]2 (30f)
p0 1
2
→00 = 1− [P (X = 0) + P (X >
1
2
)]2 (30g)
p 1
2
0→ 1
2
0 = [P (X = 0) + P (X >
1
2
)]2 (30h)
p 1
2
0→ 1
2
1 = 2P (X = 0)P (0 < X 6
1
2
)
+ P (0 < X 6 1
2
)2
(30i)
p 1
2
0→ 1
2
1
2
= 2P (0 < X 6 1
2
)P (X >
1
2
) (30j)
p 1
2
1→ 1
2
1 = [P (X = 0) + P (0 < X 6
1
2
)]2 (30k)
p 1
2
1→ 1
2
0 = 2P (X = 0)P (X >
1
2
) + P (X >
1
2
)2 (30l)
p 1
2
1→ 1
2
1
2
= 2P (0 < X 6 1
2
)P (X >
1
2
) (30m)
p1 1
2
→1 1
2
= [P (X = 0) + P (0 < X 6 1
2
)]2 (30n)
p1 1
2
→11 = 2P (X = 0)P (X >
1
2
) + P (X >
1
2
)2
+ 2P (0 < X 6 1
2
)P (X >
1
2
)
(30o)
The main observation is that the coordination processes based on M3
allow agents to change their semantics to more complex hypotheses. Since
the coordination mechanism is essentially the same in all models we con-
sider, the reason why agents may adopt more complex hypotheses lies in the
complexity of communication patterns. However, this is not the only reason
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for this to happen. Another one is the type of authority function. It is worth
noting that instances of M3 having authority functions satisfying w1 = w2
(which we do not cover here) do not allow agents to adopt more complex
hypotheses. Hence, coordination processes of M3 combined with authority
functions satisfying w1 = w2 cannot stabilize on the most quantifier, unless
both agents have 1/2 as their hypotheses all along. However, when authority
functions are differentiated, complex semantics may emerge. As one can see
from equations (30j) and (30m), in some situations the quantifier most is
achievable. The situations that allow this to happen are of peculiar nature:
by Theorem 16, an agent may choose more complex semantics only if his
interlocutor possesses complex semantics and has greater authority. We may
conclude that agents choose more complex semantics as a result of coordina-
tion processes that combine differentiated authority functions and complex
communication patterns.
If we assume that the probability P of drawing values closer to 1/2 is
greater than drawing values further from 1/2 (for example, if the random
variable X behaves similarly to a normally distributed variable with µ =
1/2), the chances of changing from 120 or
1
21 to
1
2
1
2 are higher and increase
while P (X = 0) and P (X = 1) are getting smaller.
III.8.4 Outlook: Spatial Separation
In [Allen, 1977] Thomas Allen reports on experiments aimed at finding out
how distance between engineers’ offices influences frequency of communica-
tion. The experiments show that there is a very strong negative correlation
between these two factors. This effect is known as the Allen curve. At first
sight, the discovery is not very surprising. Nevertheless, it came as a surprise,
at least to enterprise engineers, that distance is prevailing when compared
to other factors. Such effects scale up to larger populations and were al-
ready known to the regional scientists since the nineteenth century [Carey,
1858]. The so called gravity models of interaction behaviour become very
popular since the work of Stuart [Stewart, 1941], who postulated that the
intensity of interaction between populations is inversely proportional to the
squared distance between their centres. Subsequently, gravity models have
been adopted in such fields as economics, sociology and enterprise manage-
ment (see, e.g., [Sen and Smith, 1995]).
If we want to describe the evolution of semantics for larger populations,
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we must account for the effect of the distance factor. It is not immediately
obvious how to describe this dependency mathematically. Foundations of the
subject indicate how this could be done [Sen and Smith, 1995]. However, this
question is appropriate for a separate work and we do not develop our current
proposal in this direction here. Instead, we propose a simple approximation
of such a behaviour.
Assume each agent a is assigned a different point on the plane. For agents
a, b, define the spacial separation cab as the euclidean distance between a and
b. To describe the effects of distance, we posit that the chances that agents a
and b communicate are proportional to e−cab (in many contexts, the inverse
exponential function proved to approximate spatial interaction behaviour
better than other functions [Sen and Smith, 1995], however applicability of
this kind of function to situations of our interest is a matter for a separate
study). Now, agents do not communicate with probability 1, but according to
this new rule which results in communication patterns where distant agents
occur less frequently. The analysis of the effects of distance on semantics
evolution is left for future work.
III.9 Conclusions
We have presented a plausible mechanism which allows a population of com-
municating agents to arrive at a common semantic convention for a quan-
tifier construction which corresponds to a proportional quantifier. We show
that higher complexity of communication patterns may lead to the emer-
gence of more complex semantics. Moreover, our solution includes authority
of agents as an important factor of coordination. We observe a mathemat-
ical connection between the possibility of convergence and specific levels of
agents authority. According to our model, appropriate differentiation of au-
thority is important for the effectiveness of coordination, whereas equality
makes coordination more difficult or, in some circumstances, even impossible.
These properties agree with our experience. It would be desirable to inves-
tigate which types of authority functions make coordination more effective,
especially for larger populations.
It is known that many natural properties obey the rule of normal dis-
tribution. Hence, the assumption that topics of conversations obey a similar
rule seems reasonable. If this is so, the most quantifier should be used more
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frequently than other proportional quantifiers (apart from some and all) as
it allows for more efficient information sharing. This frequency distribution is
in fact evidenced by linguistic corpora [Thorne and Szymanik, 2015]. Hence,
if learning by coordination plays a major role in acquisition of proportional
quantifiers then a realistic coordination model for learning such quantifiers
should tend to converge to 1/2. Out remarks about Theorem 16 indicate
that our model may have this property. However, this matter requires fur-
ther research.
Finally, we hypothesise that there is a close connection between learning
by recognizing (Section I.3) and learning by coordination. Observe that the
results on modelM3 show that the more authoritative agent seems to behave
like a teacher in the learning by recognizing scenario (he does not change his
semantics). This may indicate that recognition and coordination are not two
different cognitive mechanisms. Instead, learning by recognizing may be seen
as a specific manifestation of a more generic mechanism of coordination.
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